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On October 3, 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia in unpro-
voked aggression and in violation of the Covenant demonstrating
thereby that the League of Nations was incapable of main-
taining world order. From this point of view, that is from
the point of view of its repercussion on the League of
Nations, a good deal has been said about the Italo-Ethiopian
War of 1935-36.
Historians and political scientists predicted and later
asserted that the Ethiopian crisis marked a crucial turning
point in the Post-First V/orld Ivar era. According to Sir
Winston Churchill, "it played a part in leading to an
infinitely more terrible war." And Geoffrey M. Gathorn-
Hardy sees that the failure of Britain and France to honor
their solemn obligation under the Covenant, and the violation
of it by Italy meant a lot of things. To England it meant
the destruction of the corner-stone of its policy— that is its





To France it meant that the enemy of
whom she stood most in terror was encouraged
to fresh audacity and rescued from his pre-
vious isolation. And finally by an act of
Sir Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1543), p. 177.
poetic justice it was destined to mean the
extinction of Italy's influence on the Danube .
and the arrival of German force|S on the
Brenner .2
But very few have written on the war itself and fev/er
still on the underlying factors that brought about the defeat
of Ethiopia. This neglect is perhaps due to the ger.eral
assumption that in the contest between a modern European
state and a primitive non-western state the defeat of the
latter was inevitable, Ethiopia was not primitive hov/ever
and neither was this the first war between Italy and Ethiopia.
As early as 1885 Italy had been preying on Ethiopian
territory and although she was repulsed each time she kept
on trying till in I896, she was decisively defeated at the
Battle of Adua. After that no further attempt was made until
about forty years later Mussolini felt himself called upon
by an irresistible destiny to found an Italian Empire in
East Africa.
After eight months of war the Fascist invaders had
successfully completed their conquest of Ethiopia. The
question which this thesis proposes to answer is: vAy did
the Ethiopians suffer an overwhelming defeat at the hand of
an enemy which they themselves had overwhelmingly defeated
only about forty years before? Several factors are given in
2Geoffrey iM. Gathorne-Hardy. A Short History of Inter-
national Affairs 1920-1Q39 (London: Humphrey Milford, 1950)
4th ed. p. 418.
the forecoinf: pages, but three are considered crucial. These
are the choatic internal situation at the time of the in-
vasion, the inequitable imposition of an arms embargo by the
great powers and the false hope given by the League of I^ations.
In writing this thesis there has been the problem of
obtaining adequate materials. Italian official documents
and original works such as the writings of Generals De Bono
Eadoglio and Graziani, for example are unavailable here.
Even in regard to the coverage of the war itself correspon-
dents were seldom allowed to be at the battlefront and see the
true situation for themselves.
However, the inadequacy of materials has not seriously
hampered this inquiry since the attempt here is to identify
the hitherto neglected factors. As an officer in the
Ethiopian army, I have some familiarity not only with the
theaters of operation and the physical nature of the country
but also with its situation and problems. This is, thus, a
critical analysis based, to an extent, on my personal acquain-
tance with the situation and, to some degree, though admittedly
to a limited degree, on professional (military as well as
scholarly) judgem.ent.
Lastly, mention must he made that Ethiopian names of
persons and places are spelled here so as to make them sound
as close to their Ethiopian pronunciation as possible.
^-- INTRODUCTORY MOTE
Ethiopia, which is said to have come into being around
1000 B.C. was nearly three thousand years old on the eve of
the Italo-Ethiopian V/ar in 1935. Such a long period of
uninterrupted history has given rise to the question: v/hy
is it that when most nations at one time or another lost and
regained their independence that Ethiopia steadily maintained
its for so long? Even more striking is the question how
was it that the Ethiopians managed to escape colonization
when in the Nineteenth Century European nations had parti-
tioned and occupied in one form or another, almost all the
non-western world especially Africa?
The Ethiopian view has always been as Emperor Haileselassie
(then Ras Teferi ) put it
Throughout history the Ethipians have
seldom met with foreigners who did not desire '' '
to possess themselves of Ethiopian territory
and to destroy their independence. With God's
help and thanks to the courage of our soldiers,
we have always, come what might, stood proud
and free upon our native mountains. •'•
?-'!any V/estern observers, however, were unwilling to
subscribe to the Ethiopian view. Varied explanations are
given but the most popular seems to be that no one had ever
'In a circular note by Has Teferi addressed to the
members of the League of Nations in 1926 as a protest to
the secret Anglo-Italian agreement which proposed to divide
Ethiopia into British and Italian spheres of influence.
made a serious effort to colonize Ethiopia. Thur;, for
example, employing one of his iir.pressive generalizations
Winston Churchill half in criticism of f^ussolini, half in
sympathy with the Fascist youth wrote in regard to the
Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.
To cast an army of nearly a quarter of a
million men upon what may well be a series of
campaigns against a people and in regions which
no conqueror in four thousand years ever thought
it worth while to subdue, is to give hostages to
fortune unparelleled in history.
^
A brief sketch of the country's history may be necessary
for an understanding of the true situation. From the rise of
Islam in the Seventh century to the Sixteenth century
Ethiopia lived through innumerable wars from which it
emerged triumphant though much exhausted and weakened.
Ethiopia's resources and energy did not permit them to re-
gain what Islam had achieved or to carry the Gospel to the
Pagans which surrounded it. But for itself if became an
island of Christianity in a continent that v/as otherwise
either totally Pagan and or in some areas Islamic. Gibbon
was, thus, partially right when he wrote
Encompassed on all sides by the enemies of
their religion the Ethiopians slept near a




3 Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman En-?3re
(London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd. 1957J Vol. V, p. 69.
They were forgotten by Europe but the enemies of their
religion could hardly allovj them, to sleep. At the sar.e
time Gibbon is right in asserting that it was after the
fifteenth century that Ethiopia emerged from isolation, but
as it came into more contact with the outisde world more
enemies began to appear.
The first serious threat came in the second quarter of
the sixteenth century when Mohammed Gran^ waged a Jihad.
Gran, who was a governor of an area roughly comprising the
South-eastern coast of present day Ethiopia, present day
Somalia and some regions in the interior of the Somalia
Coast, attacked in 1535. Kis troops were trained by Albanian
and Turkish officers and r.oreover the possession of firearms
as well as the help both in material and men which he received
from Turkey enabled him to achieve successive victories over
the spear wielding Ethiopians. In six years he had reached
the Plateau where the King and most of the monasteries lay,
burning churches and sacking whole villages as he advanced.
At this bleak moment of Ethiopia's history Portugal came to
its help in the nam.e of religion. In 1541 Christopher da
Garaa, son of the famed Vasco da Gama arrived with four hundred
men armed with matchlocks. Now the new King Galawdios, v/hose
father Lebna Dengel died a hunted fugitive as Gran followed
^His real name was Imam Ahmed Iban Ibrahim al-Ghazi; in
Ethiopia he is known as Mohammed Gran or simply Gran. In
the Eth: opic language Gran literally means left-handed which,
it is said, Mohammed was.
him from one hiding place to another, finally destroyed his
muslim enemies.
But the Portuguese did not leave after acconplishing
the task for which they came. And the Ethiopians had yet to
deal with them. Ultimately the Portuguese were also ousted
after which the country relapsed into a dismal and confused
state for nearly a century beset by internal disorders. The
Emperor had lost control of the country and his pov;ers over
regional chiefs even by feudal standards were very weak.
In fact the Emperor was only a titular figure made and unmade
by powerful regional chiefs. In the meantime successive
waves of invasions by Galla Tribes—a Pagan people except
v;here contact had been made with Islam threw the country into
more confusion.
But an adventurer named Kasa arose in the Amhara
Province (Begeraidir)—to put an end to the confusion. He
defeated all the major regional chiefs one by one and became
the most powerful man in the country. In 1855 he crowned
himself—or rather coerced the Abun (bishop) into crowning
him King of Kings, ^ under the name Theodros (Theodore).
?Iis next task was to subdue the Galla invaders which he did
after a series of counter attacks which brought him close to
the Galla homeland itself. But Emperor Theodore died without
annexing the Galla lands to his empire. This v;as done not
5since each major region had a King the national overlord
assumed the title of King of Kings or Emperor—a title which
is still retained though there are no regional kings anymore.
long afterward by Emperor Menolik. The reif^n of Thooclros
is thus a landmark in modern Ethiopian history in that it
was he who united the country. Actually there was no real
unity and the term is only relative. Perhaps it v/ould be
better to say that under Theodros the system was still a
feudal one in which, however, the Emperor assumed more pov;er
and prestige than his predecessors.
Emperor Theodros was wholeheartedly devoted to the task
of modernizing his barbarous country and hoped to achieve it
in the shortest possible time. But his ambitions were far
short of reality. Regional chiefs who accepted his over-
lordship through defeat were not willing to cooperate with
his reforms. Thus his whole ambitious plan came to nothing.
Frustration led to more frustration and in the end Theodros'
character became abnormal often reaching the point of madness.
At one time he would appear the very personification of
goodness and another which was sudden he would become an
Ethiopian Ivan the Terrible.
Such abnormality of character aliented his subjects but
so long as his personal army was strong there was nothing
they could do. The fatal moment came, however, v;hen in one
of his violent rages he imprisoned one Cameron the British
Consul. Britain had established diplomatic contact with
Ethiopia in lfi49, the first envoy being Walters Plowden. He
was succeeded by Captain V. L. Cameron. The trouble arose
v;hen, perhaps through the negligence of the British Foreign
Office, the Emperor's letter to Queen Victoria failed to
reach the latter. The Emperor felt that it was an insult to
himself as well as to his country that a monarch neglected
to reply to another. In retaliation he imprisoned Consul
Cameron. When news reached England about the imprisonment
another envoy was sent to secure release but the Emperor
responded by putting him in prison as well this time along
with sixty other Europeans. In Britain the question now
was: should steps be taken to rescue the prisoners or was
it unworthy to go into so much toil and expense inordor to
save two British subjects? The answer was typical especially
of Victorian England—British honor outweighed all other
considerations, and so the first European attack on Ethiopia
had come.
In the summer of lS67 an expeditionary force consisting
of 29,000 troops commanded by General Sir Robert Kapier
landed on the Red Sea Coast. From there the columns marched
through difficult, rugged and unhospitable mountainous
terrains for several months. In April 1868, Napier reached
the Emperor's vjalled city of Kegdela and the long awaited
battle had begun.
It was a onesided battle if indeed there was a battle.
None of the regional chiefs came to the help of his sovereign.
Most military commanders and troops who served under him and
who were attached to him by necessity rather than love began
to desert him in thousands when the battle was about to begin.
iTT*
When British guns started hurling thoir balls, Theodros had
with hin only very few loyal soldiers. Ke looked around and
said, "I have lost all Ethiopia but this rock" and upon the
rock he shot himself rather than fall into enerr.y hands alive.
The battle that was never fought was won by Kapier Baron of
Megdela.
Having accomplished his mission (which was to free the
prisoners) Napier left the country. An interesting question
now arises: why did not the British colonize the country?
There is, of course, no evidence that Naples had any orders
to do so. In fact the British government at that time was
not very keen in further aco_uisition of colonial lands. But
even if Napier wanted to he could not have accomplished the
task. To begin with the expedition itself could very well
have failed if it were not for the indifference of the
regional rulers indeed their active disobedience in time of
emergency. Many observers who had been eye witnesses like
H. Rassam who was sent to Ethiopia by the British goverrjnent
to protest Theodros' action and who was there during the
battle as well as Clement R. Markham whose History of the
Abyssinian Expedition is the best on the subject maintain
that the explanation of the success of the expedition is to
be found in the fact that the British were given aid and com-
fort by regional chiefs v;ho wanted to see the end of Theodros.
Reference to these sources is taken from Ernest V.'orx,
Ethiopia: A Pawn in European piplomacy
.
(New York: J-Iacmillan
Company, 1935) p. 55 and p. 34ti. i
--tr-f'iir
The aid help and comfort received from Kasca-Ras of
Tigrai was in particular of (ireat usiOfulnoss to the success
of the Napier Expedition. After the customary exchanfi;e of
gifts and a full display of military might on both sides
Kassa offered Napier all the guides he needed to make his
long march easier and quicker. After the meeting Kapler
proceeded to Megdela, as Greenfield put It "somewhat less
confident than before having seen the bearing and arms of
Kassa 's soldiery."' Disraeli told Parliament as soon as
word reached him "we have hoisted the union Jack on the
Mountains of Rasselas" and the members who had read Samuel
Johnson's Rasselas: Prince of Abyssinia smiled. Actually
the Union Jack if at all was hoisted momentarily. For
hoisting the Union Jack there would have meant the pacifi-
cation of so wild a country. No invader from Gran to
Graziani has ever suceeded in that exceedingly difficult task.
After the Battle of Megdela and the death of Theodros
the country once more lapsed into four years of anarchy
during which rival regional chiefs fought and fought again
for supremacy. Kassa of Tigrai ultimately emerged victorious
and was crowned in 1872 as Emperor Johannes IV. His reign
was marked by a series of wars in which Egypt and Italy were
the r.ain enemies. The first to attack was Egypt. In the very
'i'Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 86.
year of Johannes' accessian to the throne Khedive Isreail had
shaken off Turkish overlordshxp and took the latter' s Red
Sea Coast possessions as well as the Turkish Muslim outpost
of Harar now a province of Ethiopia. Thus Egypt animated by
an ephemeral renewal of that imperialism which had gained her
the old Turkish possessions attempted to extend her empire
even farther, this time at Ethiopia's expense. Egyptian
attempts were numerous but on every occassion the Ethiopians
repulsed their enemies. The crushing defeat which the
Egyptians sustained, however, was at Gundet in 1875 and at
Gura in I876, both in the present day province of Eritrea.
While the Ethiopians could have followed their enemies and
annexed the much sought port of Massawa they were content
with ending Ismail's ambitious designs.
Egypt had not only failed to conquer Ethiopia but also
by the first half of the 1880's saw her empire collapse
under the onslought of the y»ahdi—a powerful Sudanese nation-
alist who felt himself divinely ordained to create his own
empire. Having thus tested his strength with Egypt, he turned
to Ethiopia only to share the same fate as his neighbor to
the north. But the Mahdist kept on trying even after the
death of the Kahdi until 1889 when at the battle of Xetema
they were routed and again the Ethiopians failed to appreciate
the advantage of persuing a beaten ene-iiy. To the Ethiopian
fighting man success in the field of battle was an end not a
means. At this battle Johannes lost his life—hit by a stray
bullet.
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By this time tho scramble for Africa v.'as almost over
and the major European powers notably Britain and France
had little complaint. They had given themselves a lion's
share. Italy on the other hand arrived too late and v;hat she
found was such barren regions as a strip of Somaliland (later
to be extended to the whole of Italian Somaliland) , Lybia
in North Africa and some trading posts on the Red Sea Coast.
These were hardly attractive possessions. But a bigger prize
which was still free lay behind her Red Sea trading posts.
This was Ethiopia on which Italy cast her covetous eyes and
hence forth a series of conflicts would go on between Italy
and Ethiopia culminations in the War of 1935-36 and the
Liberation War of 1940-/(.l. At the center of this long strug-
gle was the desire of one to colonize; of the other to be
free. <r.
-, ',-,.-,.
As time passed Ethiopia was gaining strategic importance
and neither Britain nor France was willing to see the other
get control of the country. Equally they were unwilling to
give Italy a free hand. The construction of the Suez Canal
in 1369 had made the Red Sea a gateway of an East-V/est com-
m.erce and since Ethiopian boundary lay just behind the Red
Sea Coast the power in possession of Ethiopia could exert a
stranglehold on that throat of coiruT.erce. In the case of
Britain she had an additional interest. By 1882 England was
in defacto control of Egypt and consequently of the Sudan.
The Nile River on which life in these two countries largely
11
depends has one of its most important tributaries flowing
from the mountains of Ethiopia. Thei Blue Nile's importance
is not merely in its supply of water but also and pr;rhapE
more importantly because of the content of rich soil in the
flood which occurs every rainy season. A surveying party
sent to study the source by British authorities asserted
that Egypt's source of life was in the blue Mile and warned
that
all that would be necessary for any rival
power to do in order to transform the benefi-
cial Nile which has created Egypt into a des-
tructive flood would be simply to make a breach
in the barrier of rock at its source.
°
Vv'ith the source of the Blue Nile in the hands of Ethiopia,
England had nothing to fear but if an unfriendly power oc-
cupied Ethiopia Egypt could be endangered. France too who
had the dream of founding a large colonial empire in North
Africa would not want a power especially Britain to increase
its hold of strategic areas. Thus both Britain and France
were competing to get more influence and failing" that each was
alvrays ready to hinder the other, vv'hile the jealous rivals
were thus inspite of themselves helping the preservation of
Ethiopia's independence Italy was slowly and inconspicuously
closing on Ethiopia through the acquisition of ports and
coastal strips in the neighborhood.
Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers XCI, Egypt No. 2
(1904).
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Already in IS69 a private Italian company had purchased
from a local Sultan a trading, post called Assab on the Hod
Sea Coast. In 1682 the company sold Assab to the Italian
government. Another chance presented itself to Italy when
the extenisve but precarious Efyptiah Empire fell under
Mahdist pressure. The Italians had no difficulty in taking
Kassawa another port far north of Assab. This time
Ethiopia bepan to fear as to what Italian ultimate motive
mipht be. Besides by the Anplo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1834
Ethiopia agreed to help the evacuation of Egyptian gar-
risons marooned by the Ifehalists in the Sudan. E'ritain
promised to help Ethiopia to annex the former Egyptian
territories behind Massawa and free access to the port itself.
But unlike Ethiopia Britain did not fulfill her part of the
bargain.
The first Italo-Ethiopian conflict had begun when on
January S, 188?, a so-called scientific mission consisting of
500 armed men crossed and occupied parts of Ethiopian -ter-
ritory. The result was the Battle of Dega'ali in which the
Italian "Kission" was thouroughly defeated. Consequently all
Italian outposts v;ithin Ethiopian territory were evacuated.
Moreover Italy learned from this small lesson that penetration
by armed means was difficult. So then the Italians reverted
to the policy of undermining the strength and unity of the
country by infusinp; enemity amonn rof^ional chiefs and
fostering disobedience. In this they had a considerable
success.
In those days jealous regional chiefs v;ero unhesitating
in plottin/^ with and aidinp foreif;n enemies if they sav; any
hope or better! nf^ their position. Hitherto, however, the
consequences were not fatal to the independence. At v;orst
internal jealousy had weakened the stronfith of the nation, and
as we have seen in the case of the Theodros it rnij^ht lead to
a humilating defeat at the hands of foreign invaders, but
not to the occupation of the country by a foreign power. But
when "enelik. King of Shoa, entered into direct and secret
negotiations with Italy, it had resulted though Kenelik never
intended it, in the weakening of the country and the occupa-
tion by Italy of Ethiopian northern territory.
As King of Shea, away froir. the central government, in the
north rTenelik enjoyed unlir.ited power over his kingdom. He
conquered Gallalands to the south and expanded his territory
greatly through his large and relatively v;ell armed forces.
Thus conscious of his growing povjer Menelik became less and
less obedient to the Emperor, and the Italians were not slow
in noticing this. Accordingly after the presentation of gifts
and tem.pting promises the Italians were able to have Kenelik
sign a secret treaty in which he was promised money, arms,
the Province of Tigre and recognition as King of Kings if he
allied v;ith them in attacking Em.perior Johannes IV. To this
lU
Menelik agreed and the treaty was signed in 1832. V.'hat the
Italians would benefit from this v;as little. It neant the
annexation of Eritrea the northern most province. But the
Italians were solidifying their hold and they were ready to
wait for further demands.
When it car.e to the question of fighting Menelik did not
join the Italians but his withdrawn behavior when his country
was faced with two enemes at the same time—the Mahdistr, on
the one hand and the Italians on the other--in jffect meant
helping foreign enemies. Emperor Johannes like his predecesor
had to depend on his own regional following. His aim was
first to crush the Muslem invaders threatening from the north-
\iest and then deal with the Italians which were on their part
threatening from the northeast. Ke defeated the Moslems but
he never lived to defeat the Italians. On March 10, 18S9, he
died at the Battle of Ketema which was otherwise a com.plete
victory for the Ethiopians.
As was always the case when an emperor died, the country
lapsed into a brief but grevious confusion.
Upon the confirmation of the death of Emperor Johannes
Italy at once sent a telegram to Menelik who in 1889—the same
year the Emperor died had assumed the title of Emperor, stating
that it v/as time that a more solid friendship should be estab-
lished between the two countries. The new Emperor Menelik II
v;ho had not resisted Italy's occupation of Eritrea seemed to
fall into every trick Italy devised. On Kay 2, 1839, the
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Treaty of Uccialli was signed between f-Ienelik and Italy. The
treaty was destined to be of no duration. Soon discrepancies
were found between the Italian and Ethiopian (Amharic) versions
But the controversy centered nore on the interpretation of
Article XIV. In the Italian version the Article read: "riis
Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia consent to avail him-
self of the Italian government for any negotations v;hich.he
might enter into with other pov;ers."" In the Amharic version
the clause made it optional. The verb used conveys the sense
that the Emperor might—if he so desired—avail himself of
Italian help in foreign matters.
But as far as the Italians were concerned Ethiopia was,
by this treaty, made an Italian protectorate. And this they
were quick to inform European powers. Thus Menelik unaware
of the situation his treaty had created continued his diplo-
K.atic correspondence. He was then informed, much to his
amazement and shock, that since Ethiopia was a protectorate
of Italy they could not treat with him directly but that any
coiEnunication that he might wish to make should be channelled
through the government of Italy. Menelik' s response was
quick in which he strongly asserted that he had made no such
agreement. To the King of Italy he wrote:
Vv'hen I made the treaty of friendship with
Italy in order that our secrets might be guarded
and that undertaking should not be spoiled, I
^V.ork, OD. cit .
. p. 86.
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said that because of friendship our aifairn
in Europe might be carried on with the aid
of the sovereig:n of Italy, brt I have not made
any treaty which obliges me to do so; and
today I an not the man to accept it. That
one independent power does not seek the aid of
another to carry on its affairs your majesty
understands very well.-'-^
For three years Italy labored to achieve its aim by
peaceful means. Put having come to the realization that
no amount of intrigues, promises and entreaties would work
anymore, it prepared to go to war. In lci96 General P.araticri
with a force of 25,000 troops invaded from Eritrea. He v/as
stopped at Adua in Tigrai Province where he suffered a
crushing defeat and that battle ended Italy's dream of
creating an empire—at least until the rise of Kussolini.
To the Ethiopians the Battle of Adua of I896 marked
the m.ost decisive chapter in their history since the defeat
of Gran som.e three and a half centuries before. In somie
quarters in Europe the news was received with alarm. Germany
complained that England should have come to Italy's aid.-'--
General Kitchner expressed his desire to support Italy but
that the British government would not allow him to do so.
A.nd The Times lamiented in an editorial:
You may be sure that from one part of Africa
to the other the defeat of Italy is already
known, or will be tom:orrow--that Africa has con-






business is so serious and nothing could be
more heedless than to rejoice at the defeat
of the Italians. That defeat is also ours.-'-^
The mutual suspicion of the three pov/ers Britain,
France, and Italy and the fact that Ethiopia v;as a diffi-
cult prey prompted the powers to agree to maintain its
territorial integrity. The throe powers met in 1906 to
decide the fate of a country which was not even represented
at the meeting and in this tri-partite treaty of 1906 they
agreed that in matters that might affect the statas quo the
signatory powers could not act independently but that they
had to consult and act together.^
The three powers were thus fighting over Ethiopia
partitioning it on paper, sharing it together or losing it
together. Yet, all the while the country was actually
sovereign independent. But not by virtue of its menial
prowess had the country always preserved its independence.
We have seen that in the case of the Gran invasion the task
of repulsing the enemy would have been exceedingly difficult
without the Portuguese. During the scramble for Africa the
policies of jealous powers enabled it to get encouragement
from, one or the other of them, and moreover there was no
problem of getting arms from Europe.
l^The Times
.
London, March 5, 1896.
•'-^France: Kinistere Des Affairs etranges. Documents
Diplomatiques: Affairs d'Ethiorie (1906),
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So by a combination oi her courageous defenders , in-
accessible mountain barriers, favorable international
situations and the availability of allies when that became
necessary Ethiopia was able to maintain its independence.
This is not to suggest that Britain or France could not
have conquered her. But to begin with if one attempted to
do so the other would try to forstall the attempt. Even
without this consideration it was clear that Ethiopia v;as
by no means an easy victim. Ivould the powers risk so much
effort and expense over Ethiopia when easier prizes were
available elsewhere? In this sense only can we agree v;ith
Churchill, whom we have quoted at the beginning, that sub-
duing Ethiopia was not worth the effort. History does,
however, abundently show that many wished to possess her.
19
THE OPENING-UP OF HOSTILITIES AMD
THE ANGLO-FRENCH REACTION
Depending on his audience Mussolini offered varyinf;
Justifications for his actions in Ethiopia. If his audience
was the world at large, for instance, it was for the noble
cause of carrying the torch of civilization to a barbarous
country. But, of course, this hardly impressed even the
most naive listener. If on the other hand, the audience
was the Italian public or others who might see some logic
in this argument, he was moved by stark economic necessity
to colonize Ethiopia. Forty million Italians crowded in a
small peninsula would eventually explode unless a safety-
valve was sought and a source of raw-materials found. Act-
ually the economic conditions in Italy had improved under
Fascist leadership and life was better at that time than
before. Even if the economic explanation v/as true, it was
not the only motive. Mussolini who by word and action at-
tempted to pose as a latter day Caesar had to try to revive
"the glory that was Rome," and in order to do so he had to
match Britain and France in colonial possessions which to
him was a yardstick by which a nation's prestige was to be
measured.
Then too there was what Kirkpatrick called "primitive itch
for vengeance."* The Duce was deeply impressed by the Italian
Ivone f^irkoatrick, ITussolini: A Study in Power (New
York: Hawthorne Books Inc., 1964), p. 305.
i:o
defeat at Adua wh: ch occured when he was tv;elve. On October
2, 1935, one day before the invasion, ho announced to his
people and the world
Con 1' Ethiopia abbiamo pazientato 40 anni
ora ba;;ta2
meaning thereby that forty years of patience was enough.
V.'hether the prime motive for Mussolini's action was
economic, fulfillment of prestige or vengeance he was long
determined to invade Ethiopia. The idea came to him in
1925 as he himself told the Chamber in Kay 2, 1935.
This problem does not date from today nor
from January 1935. . . .it goes back to 1925.
Three years later it seemed That is when the
Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of Friendship was signed
that a political treaty was the instrument best
suited to assist our pacific expansion in that
vast world, still enclosed in its prehistoric
system and yet capable of great progress.
3
By 1932 he had made up his mind. Early in 1932 De Bono
was sent on a secret m.ission to Eritrea to study the possi-
bility of using that colony as a springboard for an attack
on Ethiopia. In 1933 the Duce had definitely decided that
the invasion would have to be conducted before 1936. This
was a tightly kept secret as De Bono says in his The Conquest
of an Empire
The Duce had spoken to no one of the coming
operations in East Africa, only he and I knew
^Cited in Angelo Del Boca, La p:uerra d'Abissinia 1935 -
1941
.
(riilano: Feltrinelli Editors, 1966) p. 30.
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what was facing to happen.
Thus Mussolini was only waiting for an excuse, and it
was not lone to come. On the 5^^ of December, 193^1., a minor
border conflict took place between Italian and Ethiopian
border (guards at V.'al Vial—a border town between Ethiopia
and Italian Somaliland. Italy immediately branded Ethiopia
the aggressor and demanded:
The Governor of Karar to proceed in person
to Vv'al V/al to offer ceremonial' apology. Then
payment of 200,000 dollars indemnity arrest,
dismissal and punishment of those quilty after
they shall have honoured the remains of their
victims in accordance with Somali custom.
5
This was evidently meant to create a violent response
from Ethiopia so that Mussolini might be provided with further
excuses. But Emperor Haileselassie wanted to avoid war by
all m:eans. Therefore he expressed his willingness to pay the
indemnity and to show the earnestness of his desire for peace
offered to deposit the 200,000 dollars in a bank in Geneva
as security; but first the fact must be established, and
this by an international commission in accordance with Article
V of the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928 which provided that
any dispute arising between the tv/o parties should be settled
by arbitration. Italy vigorously refused to submit the case
^Ibid., p. 507.
-"Cited in Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoires: Facing the
Dictators
.
(London: Cassell, 1962) p. 194.
'^For the full text of the Treaty see Giuliano Cora
Attualita de trattato citalo-etiooico del 1928 (Florence:
i;tet, 194S). '
to arbitration and began preparing to settle the matter by
force. Ethiopia immediately appealed to the League of
Nation (of which both Italy and Ethiopia v;ere momberr,
)
charging that :taly wa;; taking aggreosive :;tep:; In contra-
vention of the Covenant.
But Britain and France who, as we will see, did not
want the matter to be discussed in the League prevailed
upon Italy to agree to arbitration. f-Cussolini by nov; had
decided to agree to anything that might cause delay of
decision while he made his preparation for the invasion.
Thus Ethiopia withdrew the appeal made to the League and
an arbitration commission was formed. After a long and
detailed study the commission eventually cane to an agree-
ment that the V/al V/g.1 incident v;as not an intentional
provocation but an unpremeditated accident for which neither
party was to be blamed. The case was thus to be dropped.'
This v;as far from satisfying to Italy. In fact Mussolini
was not willing to settle on anything short of total occupa-
tion of Ethiopia and so he resumed his troop movement to
Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. Again Ethiopia appealed to
the League of Nations but the main actors here were Britain
and France and they were careful not to offend Italy. Thus
while it was clear that Italy v;as taking aggressive steps and
'The report was submitted by the Commission of nine of
whom Potter, whom is quoted below was a member. See Pitman
B. Potter The Iv'al V/al Arbitration (V/ashington: Rumford
Press, 19381
'
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exprcsainK its j ll-J ntention the tv/o bic; powers led the v;.uy
in (to use an American term) filibusterin,'"; the case nov/ in
the I.ca/^ue of Nations. On the second day of October 1935,
20,000,000 Italian men, women and children wore called by
sirens and church bells to hear their Duce declare v;ar on
Ethiopia. The next day the invasion began.
Eut Britain and France v;ere still endeavoring to find
a settlement that could satisfy both sides although it is
hard to conceive of any compromise between Kussolini who
vranted to annex Ethiopia to his East African Colony and
Kaileselassie who wanted to be free. But then they were in
a dilemma and had to try something. On the one hand their
conscience would not allow them to let naked aggression have
its way. On the other they desperately needed the alliance
of Italy in view of the grov;ing German threat. If they
showed hostility towards Italian action in Ethiopia J-!ussolini
might swing towards Hitler.
At the time of the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis Hitler's
defiant violation of the Treaty of Versailles, his vrarlike
activities and utterances and his vast rearmament program
had reached such menacing proportions that the victims of
the First World V.'ar were spurred to seek help against the
dangerous enemy. The reason why Britain and France were
doing all they could to stop the Italo-Ethiopian dispute from
being taken by the League, stems from this fact. They would •
be in an embarassing situation if the League branded Italy
the anr.ressor. This would require them either to take the
necessary measures acoordinc to the Covenant or rofu:;o to
do so and thus destroy an orcanization in which together
with President V.'ilson of the United States they had been
the principal supporters.
Of the two big powers France had indeed more reason to
fear German resurgence and was therefore more v;illing to go
to any extent to appease Mussolini. Germany had been France's
age-old enemy and Hitler had made it unmistakably clear both
in his private utterances and in Mein Kempf that he v/as out
to destroy France as a power and build a German hegemony in
Europe. On the other hand he spoke with conceliatory tone
in regard to Britain. So long as Britain did not hinder his
ambition in continental Europe, he was willing to accept, or
rather not to contest, her maritime superiority.
British foreign policy in regard to the Ethiopian Crisis
was not at any rate so bent as to appease Italy unconditionally.
In public statements both in the League as well as outside
it, Britain had always expressed her support of the League
Covenant. On September 11, 1935,- Sir Samuel Hoare, British
Foreign Secretary declared
In conformity with its precise and explicit
obligations the League stands, and my country
stands with it, for the collective maintenance
of the Covenant in its Intirety, and especially
for the steady and collective resistance to all
acts of unprovoked aggression,
adding, however.
i;5
if risks of peace are to be run, they must be
run by all. The security of the many cannot
be assured by the efforts of the fev;, hov;ever
powerful they may be.^
Put France war; not willinR to say or act in a manner
that might incur the displeasure of Mussolini. H. Pierre
Laval the French Prime Minister set out for Rome in early
January 1935 and on the S^h signed an agreement with Italy
—
an agreement which might have surprised even its Italian
beneficiary. Ey this rapprochement— commonly known as the
Home Agreement— Italy received from France territorial con-
cessions in Tunisia and French Somaliland. Furthermore
France agreed to transfer to Italy 2,500 shares of the
Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway jointly ovmed by France and
Ethiopia.^ It was also generally believed that during this
meeting Laval gave Mussolini the Carte blanche for his ag-
gression in Ethiopia. This argument was later contested by
Laval himself but in the light of his attitude it was not
unnatural that Mussolini believed that France would not be
concerned with what happened to Ethiopia.
In the meantime conditions in Europe were becoming tense.
On Miarch 16, 1935, Hitler declared his intension to rearm
Germany vowing that the Fatherland would no longer remain
League of Kations, Records of the Sixteenth Ordinary
Session of the Assembly Plenary Meetings. Text of the Debat e;
p. i.6.
^See Hoyal Institute of International Affairs, Document;
on International Affairs . (1935: Vol. I) (London: Humphrey
Miilford, 1937T!
ch.-iinod by the Versailles Treaty. France was piottin;^ r.ore
frantic at every German move, though that is not to suggest
that Britain and other European powers v;ero not concerned.
Under French insistence Britain, France and Italy met
at Stresa to discuss what should bo done and after a meeting
which lasted from April 10 to 14, 1935, the three pov;ers
found themselves
In complete agreement in opposing by all
practicable means any unilateral repudiation
of treaties which may ondangsr the peace of
Europe and will act in close and cordial col-
labaration for this purpose.-'-" (Italics supplied)
But when on June 18, 1935, Britain and Germany signed
the Anglo-German Naval Accord, Laval felt that the Stresa
Agreement had been watered down by Britain. Actually the
Anglo-German accord merely set the ratio of German and
British navies. By this it was agreed that the British and
German navies were to be kept at the ratio of 35:100 and
that Germany v;ould be allowed to possess as much submarine
tonnage as the British Comjnonwealth. But to France it
appeared that any Anglo-German understanding would strip her
of her allies and eventually lead to the death blow which
Hitler had long sworn to give her.
After this shocking news Laval did not waste a single
day. Next morning he succeeded in signing with Italy a
military pact in which it was agreed that if Germany attacked





cither p.'irty the other would corao to itc aid. Thu:; the
Franco-Italian colldarity which had cxlr-tod cinco Laval had
rushed to Rome and made more lavish concessions had beccrne
firm. Ho must have felt justified in his appeasment of Italy
at all costs, believing that by doing so he v;as averting a
greater danger, L' Intransigeant
, a French nev/s paper, said
that Britain should be warned that France would stand by its
Latin sister and that Italy should not be hindered in its
"work of civilization of Ethiopia." This sentiment was
echoed by many French Fascist sympathizers as well as true
nationalists who felt that their country's best interests were
served by befriending Italy. As for Laval himself it is hard
to determine why he was so unconditionally pro I'ussolini. Lord
Vansittart then Permanent Under Secretary in the foreign
office hints that Laval "one of the few in v/hom the micro-
scope has revealed nothing but more teeming decomposition"
was already in 1935 a traitor in- the service of Hitler and
Kussolini. But Gathorne-Hardy giving the Premier the
benefit of the doubt describes him as perhaps a patriotic
man who did not hesitate to resort to unscrupulous and
dishonest means of effecting his narrow-minded patriotism.
Indeed:
^•'Intransigeant
. June 19, 1935-
12Cited in G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of Inter-
national Affairs 1920-1939
.
(London; 1950) 4th ed. p. 392.
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The French made no concealment of their
nnively unprincipled hope that they might be
able to sabotapo the application of the
Covenant apainst Italy in order to preserve
this self-same Covenant intact for future
use against Germany with a triumphant Italian
Covenant-breaker helping France, in the name
of the Covenant, to hold Germany in check l-"--*
In the case of the British it was like trying to eat
one's cake and have it too. The conservative party headed
by Mr. Baldwin wanted to avoid war and at the same tim.e it
wanted to uphold the League Covenant— an impossible con-
tradiction because the application of the theory of collective
security meant war, and this the party was not willing to do.
Moreover Vx . Baldwin was cautious not to alienate Italy by
taking bold support of the League although apparent British
support of the League had already annoyed Mussolini. But
then a large number of the British public was annoyed by
Italian aggressive mood. This was particularly prevalent
among the Laborites and Labour unions as well as many indi-
vidual men and wom.en. The Conservative Party in power could
not publicly disagree with the public view. It knew fully
v/ell that in 1922 Lloyd George was forced out by possible
public opinion when he insisted on going to war vath Turkey.
Thus the government had to go through the motion of appearing
to be resolutely opposed to Mussolini's aggressive designs.
Consequently mutual suspicion between Britain and France





Mu!-;-olini. thounht thnt T.ri.tnJ n meant buninon:) v;hon V.unrb
<ieclnrod thnt "the League stands and my country ntandr: with
it. "* Consequently Italian radios and news papers started a
violent anti-Pritish propaganda charging that Britain v/as
playing a dog-in-the manger-role denying Italy her liveli-
hood in Ethiopia. When Italian anti-Eritish propaganda in-
creased and -Mussolini began massing troops in his East African
colonies there was a growing apprehension that Italy might
attack British possessions in north and east Africa. The
government of Great Britain had to take precautions. By
September 20, almost the entire British Home Fleet was con-
centrated in the Mediterranean between Gibraltar and the
Suez Canal. This in turn caused more suspicion in Italy
and so continued a chain reaction of suspicions and counter-
suspicions.
f-'r. Baldwin's government in spite of its outv/ard motions
was, of course, not intending to do anything that might bring
about war and this Mussolini eventually realized. If the
Italian dictator did not come to know about this (through
informal Anglo-Italian conversations) perhaps the British
hard line stand could have had a strong effect on him. That
is, the threat of sanctions would have sufficed to deter hin
from risking a war v;ith Britain and other League members.
But when he found out that Britain did not mean to support
word with action he went ahead v^ith his invasion of EthioDia.
"^See above pp. 2^.-25.
iO
THE HOARE-UVAL PEACE PLAN
The Italo-Ethiopian VJar had been going on for tv/o months
and the League had come to the conclusion that Italy vjas the
aggressor, but it was still undecided what steps to take. In
the meantime Britain and France were trying to find a settle-
ment outside the League—a decision that might be acceptable
to the League, to Ethiopia and above all to Italy—whose
friendship was necessary to these two powers. Iftiat settle-
ment there could possibly be that would satisfy the three
parties? . .'/l' * 'V- }'i.
Nevertheless Sir Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval did
ultimately come out with a solution— the Hoare-Laval Peace
Plan. On December 9, 1935, the plan vras duly communicated
to the Italian and Ethiopian governments. It was as humili-
ating to Ethiopia as it was unacceptable to Italy. Part one
of the proposal demanded the cession to Italy by Ethiopia
of Eastern Tigrai in the Korth and part of the Ethiopian
territory adjacent to Italian Somalilana in the South. The
second part dealt with Italian economic expansion and settle-
ment in Ethiopia. This proposed the formation in Southern
Ethiopia of a zone which would form an integral part of
Ethiopia but where Italy would enjoy exclusive economic rights
which might be administered by a previlaged
company or by any other like organization to
which would be recognized— subject to the
31
acquired ri/^hts of natives and foreipnerc
—
the right of ownership of unoccupied territories,
the monopoly of the exploitation" of mines, forenta
etc. 15
The plan also provided that in return Ethiopia should be
given an outlet to the sea through the part of Asab v/hich
Italy was to cede together with a corridor giving access to
that port. In short the Koare-Laval Plan meant that in
return for the cession by Italy of a shori; corridor and a
small port, she would get 60,000 square miles of territory
in direct gift and another 160,000 in the form of an exclusive
commercial development sphere. In effect the proposal was
asking Ethiopia to cede to its Italian aggressor in a more
or less desguised form and under the pretext of a fallacious
territorial exchange half of its national territory pending
the annexation of the other half.
On December 10, the Principal Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs telegraphed the British Minister in Addis
Ababa to use his utmost influence to induce the Ethiopian
Emperor on no account to reject the Hoare-Laval Plan. The
Secretary even ventured to hope that the Emperor would "give
further proof of his statemanship by realizing the advantage
of the opportunity of negotiation. "'^
But it was hard to see what advantage, if any, Ethiopia
.
-"GT-eat Britain, British and Foreign State Papers--1935
,




could pot out of tho nopotiation unless, of course, thoy
vjore asking her to choose between total annexation or
partial absorption of her territory by the aEf'.ressor. I'or
could the British public see the justness of this plan.
British public opinion was in fact so hostile that the
Baldwin government was on the verge of resigning, but was
forstalled by the resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare.
Mussolini did not accept the plan either in spite of
the fact that it was generous to Italy. Actually why should
he accept? If the two powers went that far to appease him,
it was a clear proof of their weakness or of his importance
—
at least in their eyes. In that case they would eventually
yield to his full demand and his duty was to stick to a
hard line. He knew that France— Italy's "Latin Sister" was
sympathetic to him. As for Britain he considered her "as a
frightened, flabby old woman, who at the worst v;ould only
bluster and v;as, anyhow, incapable of making war."-*-'
Mussolini produced his own version of what the compromise
should be. According to him Ethiopia proper consisted of
most of Eritrea, Tigrai, Eegemidir, Gojam and Shoa. These he
was willing not to occupy directly. Even then the position
of Ethiopia proper was to be like that of Egypt under the
British. Moreover he was totally opposed to the idea of





make her a maritime power "thus heightening the real threat
she constitutes to Italy. "-^^
The two powers had thus failed to appease Mussolini.
A policy of appeasement does not satisfy the appetite of an
aggressor; it only wets it. At the saxe time it is, as
Sir Anthony Eden puts it "more likely to breed doubting
friends than daunt would-be enemies."^'-' Actually what
Britain and France for all their pains made out of Mussolini
was a doubting friend. When the supreme test came at the
outbreak of the Second V/ar, Mussolini threw in his lot with
a comrade-in-dictatorship—the other German dictator.
^Citec in Vera Michales Dean v/ith the aid of the staff
of Geneva Research Center, "The League and the Italian-
Ethiopian Dispute," Geneva Special Studies 1934-35 .
2'-'Eden, oo. cit .
. p. 245.
IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
The Hoare-Laval plan had been dropped and the matter
fell back to the League where Ethiopia's last hope lay. It
was, after all, the promise of the theory of collective
security that prompted Ethiopia to seek membership in 1921
and fight for two years despite strong opposition. Britain
was for one, opposed to Ethiopia's membership on the ground
that the latter could not qualify as a civilized nation be-
cause she allowed slavery. Ironically it was Italy which
strongly supported her membership stating that if the
Ethiopian government could assure the League of Nations
that it would do everything to completely abolish slavery,
introduce reforms into the country and thus meet the re-
quirements in the Covenant, then Ethiopia's appeal for mem-
bership should not be denied. Actually, Mussolini was the
last person who would want Ethiopia in the League of Nations
as this meant that nations would be required to participate
in a collective action should she be attacked. Thus, at
first he was opposed to the idea, but remembering that ad-
mission was made by a two-thirds majority, his attempt to
block her would be of no avail. Under such circumstances it
v;as better to pose as a friend than as an enemy.
^
For documentary evidence of Italian policy towards
Ethiopian participation in International Conferences seeGeorge W. Baer, The Coming: of the Italian Ethiopian War(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 196?)
In 1923 Ethiopia was admitted.
Yet when the League of Nations found Italy guilty of
aggression and Ethiopia invoked Article XVI of the Covenant
(an article which required the League to take economic
sanctions or military action or both against an aggressor)
r-Iussolini did not feel that he was contradicting himself
when he argued that a barbarous nation like Ethiopia had no
right to invcke the Covenant against a civilized state. As
for his support in the admittance of Ethiopia to the League
of Nations, he was prepared to plead that he was mistaken
but that a single error of judgement should not inhibit
1
civilization from breaking the last stronghold of barbarism.
Moreover he assumed that colonial wars differed from European
wars both on the plane of ethics and the plane of expediency.
Thus he warned:
If the League of Nations vrere so reckless
as to expand a remote colonial campaign into a
general European war. . . .it would cost this
time, not millions but tens of millions of
lives. Then it would be upon the League that
the guilt would rest.
2
Actually this was precisely what the big powers were
trying to avoid, but Mussolini made it difficult for them to
keep quiet and watch indifferently. He had rejected their
good offices and moreover he launched his invasion in an
obvious violation of the Covenant. By his unveiled and bold
'^Quoted in The Times
.
London, October 4, 1935.
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violation of the League Covenant Muccolini left Britain and
France no chance except to support the opinion of alncst the
entire member states who found Italy the aggressor. These
pov;ers, especially France, had no intention of going all
the way to make it hard for Mussolini, and he knew it. The
French Prime Minister had already made it clear as the
Manchester Guardian reported that he would not agree to any
military action. The Manchester Guardian correspondent v;ho
dispatched this information from Geneva added:
M. Laval has, I understand, given an
understanding to Mussolini that France
will not join in any but economic and finan-
cial sanctions, so long as, he M. Laval
is Prime Minister, and Signer Mussolini has
said that he would not regard French partici-
pation only in economic and financial sanc-
tions as an unfriendly act.-*
Actually France was not doing what Britain would not
do. In fact only three days before the fenchester Guardian
correspondent sent his dispatch the British and the French
goverrjT.ents had agreed to do Just what M. Laval is accused of
in the above quotation. On December 28, 1935, Laval told
the French Chamber that on September the French had agreed:
to rule out military sanctions, not to
adopt any measure that might lead to a naval
war and thus not to contemplate the closure of
the Suez Canal. In a word we have agreed to
rule out everything that might lead to war.'i-
'
''anchester Guardian
. September 13, 1935.
France, Journal Officiel: Chamber des Deputes , December
1935, p. 2363.
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In effect this meant that Mussolini arrogated to himself
the right to decide what sanctions might be taken. And so
he allowed Britain and France to adopt sanctions against him,
but not sanctions that,, in his judgement could lead to v/ar.
This fact is made more evident by Mussolini's reaction
towards these powers. On I-Iay 5, 1936, Mussolini said in an
interview that even though Britain and France had imposed
economic sanctions against Italy, he did not consider them
as unfriendly nations and that, therefore, he was willing
to allow them a share in economic ventures in Ethiopia.
The question of military measures was ruled out and
what Ethiopia could hope for was some kind of economic
sanctions. In October 1935, the League of Nations enforced
economic sanctions. The following items v;ere considered by
economic experts as appropriate. , ,,^
1. Arms embargo; prohibition of arms
and ammunition to Italy, including materials
for chemical warfare, all aircraft and aircraft
engines, rubber, iron and such other items.
2. Financial embargo: ban of all loans,
shares issues, banking credits and advances for
or on behalf of the Italian Government.
3. Import embargo: prohibition of impor-
tation of ail goods (except gold or silver bullion)





"Taken from Leonard L. Leonard, International Organiza -
tions
.
(New York: McGrew Hill Company, 1951), p. 151.
"TRSr*
But oil without which Italian invasion could not have
continued for long was not included. The spraying of poison
gas over combatants and non combatants alike by Italian air-
crafts and the consequent r.utiliation of men, women, and
children would not have been possible if the oil fuel for
aeroplanes had not been supplied by the member states from
whom Italy imported 75^ of its oil. VyT:iatever oil resources
might have been stored would have been exhausted long before
the use of poison gas reached its height in March and April
1936. I'ussolini himself later confessed to Hitler in 1938
that "if oil sanctions was imposed, I would have had to
I
n
order a withdrawal from Abyssinia in a week."'
Even the sanctions which were agreed upon on paper
could not be applied effectively. In the first place the
preparation, adjustment, coordination, and a host of other
consideration that had to be taken made it practically impos-
sible to enforce the sanctions at the time when they could
have been effective. Thus, at first the application of econom-
ic sanction had to be discussed by subcommittees, expert
groups and committees of coordination. Then governments were
faced with problems in carrying out an effective program of
sanctions. The actions of fifty nations had to be synchron-
ized, and each had its own constitutional procedures, its
ovm internal political and economic oroblems.
lr~.Quoted in Frederick Hartmann. The Relations of Nations
(New York: The Macf'dllan Company, 1957) p. 373 n.
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Then too a time limit had to be set for all states to
begin sanctions at the same time lest some should suffer more
than others. Consequently monthly reports had to be issued
on the results of sanctions by each state, ambiguities had
to be cleared avjay and steps had to be taken to insure that
those member states that had close economic ties with Italy
did not suffer disproportionately. The result of all this
was that the Fascist armies were given time to complete their
conquest before effective sanctions could be imposed.
Moreover in the League of Nations itself four members
refused to impose any sanctions at all, on the pretext that
they were economically so interdependent with Italy that they
could not do so without hurting their own economy. Among
those who agreed seven states did not apply the arms embargo,
eight did not take financial measures, ten simply pretended
as if there were no sanctions and continued their normal trade
and thirteen did not prohibit imports from the Italians. Then
too there was the United States a non League member with whom
Italy could trade and so she did on a grand scale as will be
seen in the Chapter of "Arms Embargo."
To add insult to injury the League of Nations lifted the
sanctions on July 4, 1936. The sanctions were, of course,
ineffective, but to lift them only two months after the war
v;as over on the battlefield meant condoning Fascist aggression
^Itid.
/.o
against Ethiopia. Had the sanction, half-hearted as they
were, continued, Italy's economy might have suffered in
the longrun and this might possibly have pressured Kussolini
to come to some negotiated settlement.
If not the sole, at least the main reason for the exis-
tence of the League of Nations was to end aggression and all
armed conflicts as means of settlement of international dif-
ferences. In letting Italy invade Ethiopia with impunity,
it had failed in its prime duty. The Theory of Collective
Security demanded that first peaceful means such as economic
sanctions should be tried to bring the aggressor to his
knees. But if this failed then military measures had to be
taken. The League only irresolutely tried the first and not
at all the second.
From its beginning the League of Nations had not been
conceived as the preserver of vjorld peace as such. It was
primarily the work of the allied powers of the First V.'orld
V/ar. Hence the drafters of the Covenant were immediately
concerned with the establishment of a status quo of their
own making which was designed to keep Germany from disturbing
them again. Thus
The functions envisaged for the League was
not so much to keep peace, but to keep a specific
peace—to legitimize and stabilize a particular
world settlement based upon victory."
°Inis L. Claude Jr. Swords into Ploughshares (New York:
andom House, I964) p. 44.
Put conflictG are like wildfire and once peace v;ac
threatened somewhere it proved difficult to keep that specific
peace. For if an European aEgressor could not bo checked in
Ethiopia what guarantee was there that he would not run amok
in Europe? V.'e night even go back and argue that if Japan's
aggression in Manchuria was prevented Italy might not have
dared to invade Ethiopia. By the same token Hitler would
probably never have committed such flagrant aggressions as
he did following Mussolini's success. Again if Germany was
resolutely opposed earlier Japan might not have been presented
with the temptation which Hitler's early successes made pos-
sible.
But because of the uncertainties of the new system of
collective security the great powers could not feel safe and
so they could not abandon the system they were used to—the
balance-of-power system. The result was, however, as the
Ethiopian crisis well illustrated, that there was no system
that could restrain aggression.
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IMPOSITION OF ARMS EMBARGO
If the great powers could not live up to their solemn
duty, at least they should not have facilitated the aggressor's
path by denying the victim all means of self-defense. Yet
this is what actually happened when Britain and France—from
whom Ethiopia bought most of its arms—imposed an arms
embargo on both belligerents equally. But Italy was an in-
dustrialized country which manufactured most of its own war
supplies and so long as it could import the necessary items
in the form of raw materials the measure hardly affected
Mussolini's efforts. At the same tim.e it meant that Ethiopia,
a non-manufacturing country, could not buy arms for its self-
defense even though Italy was declared the aggressor— and
Ethiopia the victim.
Britain and France were moreover bound by an additional
treaty to help Ethiopia in obtaining "all arms and munitions
necessary for the defense of her territories from external
aggression and for the preservation of internal order therein. "^
In spite of a strong sentiment in the British public,
favoring the sale of arms to Ethiopia, the Baldwin Government
would not do anything that might anger the already angry
Mussolini. Among influential authorities there were men like





who felt that the arms embargo v;as a breach of a treaty as
well as inequitable, but to no avail? Lloyd George suggested
that if the British government could not have the nerve
officially to endorse the sale of arms to Ethiopia it should
at least "drop a hint to Vickers"—an armament company. Only
when ^!usEolini had invaded and firmly secured his beachhead
did the British drop a slight hint. Even then very few
licences for arms export to Ethiopia were granted with un-
necessary caution—unnecessary because this did not tbate
Mussolini's anger. In his eyes the mere fact that, however
restricted, Britain was selling arms to Ethiopia was bad
enough. The Ethiopian request was to purchase surplus war
office stocks of rifles and aeroplanes; what the British al-
lovred was six million rounds of ammunition.
But Laval of France was more careful not to incur
Mussolini's displeasure. In June 1935 three months before the
invasion several hundred boxes of ammunition and rifles des-
tined for Ethiopia had arrived at Jibuti—a port in the
French Somaliland. But the French Customs Director vjould not
allow the arms to go to their destination, and when someone
reminded him of the existence of a treaty which allowed
Ethiopia to import arms via Djibuti he is reported to have
replied: ' • ' .
^Ibid
. , p. 252.
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Yes, but under the condition that such
entry should be accompanied by several licences
and many permissions. It always happens that
one or the other is missing.
3
On the other hand Italian troops and armaments were
allowed to pass through the Suez Canal to perform pricisely
what the League of Nations including Britain and France had
condemned. Some even tried to justify the British action by
arguing that if Britain closed the Canal to Italian warships
the latter' s suicide squadrons of dive-bombers would have
hurled themselves upon the fleet lying at Alexandria. But
?"iussolini had meither the power nor the nerves to risk a
war with Britain. The Italian navy was one-fourth of that
of Britain and much less in quality. Its air power was like-
wise inferior and its conscript army—though numerous—did
not have the capacity to challenge the British. That is
v;hy Sir Iv'inston Churchill remarked that "if ever there was
an opportunity of striking a decisive blow in a generous cause
v;ith the minimum of risk it was here and now."^
The difference between this and previous Italo-Ethiopian
armed conflicts was that in the past Italy was well equipped
and Ethiopia less equipped but not completely unequipped. Now
it v;as a war between a fully-armed modern army and an almost
>Cited in Ministry of Information, Liberation Silver
Jublee 19itl-1966 (Addis Ababa: Publications and Foreign
Languages Press Department, 1966), p. 6.




unarmed feudal host. V/hon the vrar started, there was a
general feeling in Europe that it v/ould take Italy a long
time to conquer Ethiopia. 5 In the first place when the
rainy season came in June, the invaders would be bogged
down in mud for its five-month duration. As it turned out
the rains hampered the defenders rather than the aggressor.
Then too the Ethiopians in accordance with their past tra-
dition were expected to put up a stout resistance. But a
stout resistance without arms can hardly last long and the
Fascist armies were able to complete their conquest in Hay
1936 before the rainy season began. Had the arms embargo
been lifted the resistance would, as Vx. Anthony Eden ob-
serves, in his memoirs, have been immeasurably stiffened.
To make matters worse the Suez Canal was opened for the
Italian armies to pass through and kill a disarmed people.
U.S. Neutrality
Herbert Feis who was economic advisor to the Department
of State and advisor on international economic affairs at
the time of the Italo-Ethiopian V/ar remarks: ''There was only
one country strong enough and free enough to turn the balance
against Mussolini if it so willed—the United States."'
--For example See Eden, 00. cit .
. p.
See below p. 72.
7
'Herbert Feis, Seen From E.A.: Three International
Episodes (New York: Alfred A. Knopp, Inc., 1947), p. 218.
ut
True the United States was not a member of the League
of Nations and thus should not, ordinarily have been ex-
pected to have applied sanctions. But it was a member of
the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 which renounced war. The
philosophy underlying the pact was that there could not be
neutrality in matters affecting international peace. If
the pact had outlawed war, anyone who resorted to it was
an outlaw and should not be treated with neutrality.
However, immediately after Italy launched its invasion
of Ethiopia President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke in San
Diego: "Despite what happens in continents overseas, the
United States of America shall and must remain.
. .unentangled
and free." The speech was actually an assertion of the
Neutrality Act he had signed on August 31, 1935. This pro-
hibited the shipment of arms to warring nations and barred
American vessels from carrying war materials to belligerents.
On the surface this neutrality affected neither of the
belligerents since neither Ethiopia nor Italy imported arms
from America. But again Italy was a manufacturing country
and Ethiopia was not, so that while Italy could import raw
materials and produce its own armaments Ethiopia got the worst
of the Neutrality Act.
Italy's military effectiveness depended, to a significant
extent, on imports of American raw raterials such as iron
^The New York Times
. Oct. 6, 1935.
U1
ore and oil. These strategic materials vjere exported in
far greater quantities during the war than before it. Thus
according to U.S. official statistics 62,169 tons of scrap
iron were shipped to Italy in July 1935 as against 21,803 in
July 1934.^ Shipment of oil to Italy also increased during
the war by 600%. Thus by prohibiting the sell of arms to
Ethiopia while increasing the export of strategic supplies
to Italy, the U.S.A. was in effect supporting the aggressor.
Recognizing the inequity of the Neutrality Act as it existed
Senators Nye and Clark and Congressman Maverick on January 6,
1936 introduced a bill proposing the limitations of the export
of strategic materials to both belligerents. '•' Soon after
Congressman Ludlow introduced a more strict embargo on all
12trace with belligerent states.
If either of these bills were passed the Italian war
effort would have been hurt. But the bills failed to receive
endorsement. In the first place those men in Congress who
opposed U.S. participation in international cooperation (the
opponents of U.S. membership in the League of Nations for
example) felt that cutting trade with Italy was participating
in the sanctions imposed by the League, and this they could not
"Hartman, on. cit .
, p. 374.
^^The New York Times
. November 6, 1935.




accept. Others like the famous isolationict Senators
Borah and Johnson opposed strict embargoes because it ap-
peared to them as a surrender of American trading rights.
There was another group of legislators who entertained pro-
Fascist sympathisers. These were especially prevalent among
legislators whose constituents contained large numbers of
13Italian-Americans.
But there were also many Americans who felt that the
U.S. should not and ought not remain neutral when peace was
threatened. Bishop Vj'illiam T. fenning of the Cathedral of
St. John the Divine of New York City, for example v/ondered
whether the nation could claim that it vras fulfilling its
share of the obligation to uphold world peace.
^
The fact that the United States was not a member of the
League of Nations posed in theory as well as in fact, several
problems. Thus even if the League of Nations took military
actions against Italy for example it could not count in the
support of the United States for the supply of weapons if
such a need arose. Cr if on the othe:;hand, it applied
effective economic sanctions it was doubtful whether the
United States would not offset the effort by increasing its
trade with Italy as it actually did.
-^For broader discussion of pro-Italian feelings in the
U.S.A. See y:anfred Jonas, "Pro-Axis Sentiments," The Historian
(Feb. 1967) Vol. 29.
-'•^The New York Times
. Oct. 7, 1935.
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Although the Neutrality Act of 1935 specifies that an
embargo would be imposed only on munitions of vyar-meaning
finished instruments of war— Secretary of State Cordell Hull
gave indications that America would consider widening the
definition of embargo items if the League of Nations adopted
economic sanctions. ^ gut the Pittman Bill which proposed
to give the President the mandate to use his discretion in
imposing embargoes was opposed by the isolationists who
feared that Roosevelt might use the power to cooperate with
the League of Nations. Such an act, according to the isola-
tionists was unneutral and might bring the U.S. into entang-
lements in world affairs—a situation which they had always
wanted to avoid.
So in the end the only interest the U.S. government
showed in the Italo-Ethiopian war was in regard to the air
bombardment of Addis Abeba and Dire Dua. Secretary Hull in
a telegram to the U.S. ambassador in Home expressed his con-
cern over the bombardment of these cities and instructed the
ambassador to inform the Rome government of U.S. disapproval
of the Act. Hull did not say that the United States disap-
proved of air attacks on all civilian centers although many
open cities were being bombed. The reason why he was partic-
ularly interested in Dire Dua and Addis Abeba was, as the Nev/





in these cities. There were only few Americans in Addi£
Abeba and fewer still in Dire Dua.
^^The Mew York Times
. October 8, 1935.
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INTERNAL INSTABILITY
Fighting one another and even aiding a foreign enemy
against their own national leader' was a common thing among
jealous Ethiopian fuedal chiefs. Emperor Johannes IV, then
a powerful feudal lord in Tigrai watched with quiet satis-
faction the destruction of Emperor Theodros at the hands of
the British Expeditionary Force. Similarly Menelik King of
Shoa, later Emperor, entered into a secret agreement to aid
Italy against Johannes. But in both cases as in all others,
the chiefs never cooperated with a foreign enemy if he meant
to conquer and hold their country. Indeed when such a situ-
ation arose they forgot their rivalries and stood solidly
behind their emperor. In the first place the occupation of
the country by a foreign power meant the destruction of
their previleged positions. At best they vrould be reduced
to the status of the English barons under their Norman
conquerors and at worst to that of the Nigerian chiefs under
the British system, of indirect rule.
But the most driving force behind this unity was their
religion. The Ethiopian church is, of course, fundamentally
within the fold of the Eastern Orthodox Church; however, an
isolation of over a thousand years had naturally resulted in
the Ethiopianization— indeed the barbarization of ritual and
dogma. Yet to the Ethiopian there was only one true faith
and that was his. Thus as in their food, their costumes
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their script and their calander, the Ethiopians also made
their church unique. Thus when an emperor uttered the
formula "for country, religion and King" the response v/as
always almost unanimous but the magic word in the formula
was not so much "King" or "Country" as "religion."
There is a general tendencyto date the breakdown of
feudalism in Ethiopia from the reign of Kenelik. It is
true that he had the desire to modernize the country, but
neither conditions, nor his own imagination mieasured up to
the task, so that the reforms he introduced such as the
establishment of ministerial department, the building of the
Diibuti-Addis Ababa railway and the introduction of telephone
communication in certain areas were nothing more than rare
rudimentary signs of modernization in a country that was
otherwise thouroughly feudal. The task of genuine reforms
had to wait until Haileselassie came to power.
After Menelik's death in 1913, his grandson Lij Eyasu
ascended the throne but he was not destined to stay long. His
irrisponsible behavior and his leanings towards Islam aroused
the suspicion of the church as well as the jealous nobles.
Has Teferi one of the most ambitious young nobles and by far
the shrewdest of the lot continued to get the support of the
church and influential groups to deal with the unruly Emperor.
In 1916 Has Teferi led an army against supporters of Lij
Eyasu and defeated them, captured the Emperor himself and
put him in prison. Menelik's daughter, Zewditu, was crowned
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empress and Teferi became Recent and heir to the throne.
Starting with the regency of Ras Teferi, serious and
genuine steps were attempted to westernize Ethiopia. As a
regent Teferi lacked the authority to carry his ambitious
reform plans, and although in 1928 he became Negus—the
highest rank below emperor--still his efforts met strong
resistance from influential groups of the old-guard nobility.
In 1930 upon the death of Empress Zewditu Negus Teferi was
crowned Emperor under the name Haileselassie I. Now he was
legally in a position to launch his reform plans. But to
reform a country whose archaic values had been hardened over
many centuries was an exceedingly difficult task that could
not be achieved in a short time. The Emperor had been in
pov;er barely four years and his reform plans had created
dissentions, alienations, and even cessionist tendencies when
the Italo-Ethiopian conflict started in 1934 following the
V/al 'ti&l incident.
The church that had supported the Emperor (then Ras
Teferi) against Lij Eyasu now resented his westernizing
efforts. The Ethiopian clergy seldom distinguished dogma
from custom and any novel idea that undermined the traditional
way of life appeared to them irreligious. The feudal chiefs
for their part had an added reason to oppose the reforms.
The establishment of a modern centralized government meant
they would be stripped of the virtually independent status
which they had hitherto enjoyed.
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Thus revolt;; sprung up evoryv;here. The Governor of
Sidamo Province in southern Ethiopia, Dejazmatch Ealcha had
rebelled as early as 192fi and great effort was required to
subdue him. In 1930 the Governor of Begemedir, Has Gugsa
Iv'olie, revolted and again it took much bloodshed to suppress
him, Li,i Eyasu who had been in prison since his deposition
in 1916 also escaped and with the help of loyal troops tried
to regain the throne. He was, however, recaptured and put
back in prison. In 1932 a revolt had to be put down in
Gojam. In 1934 the very year Italy was preparing to attack
Northern Tigre revolted and was put down only after severe
fighting. In the same year Fitawrary Biru an avowed reac-
tionary of the old-guard circles also tried in vein to over-
throw the Emperor Haileselassie's regime. All these incidents
made the country unstable—a situation which was and is fatal
in time of war.
It was well to replace traditional rulers by westernized
and younger men, but these men almost exclusively came from
Shoa, the ruling province and this was resented by the other
provinces, more so by the non-traditional Ethiopian regions
that felt that the establishment of a centralized government
under exclusive Shoan leadership vras another device for per-
petuating the tyranny of that province. Thus the Italian
government was actually right (though for its own selfish
Traditional Ethiopia consisted of Tigrai, Begemedir,
Gojam, Wollo, and Shoa. Ethnically the people in these
regions are generally of the Hametic-Semetic aiad mixture—
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motive) when in a raomorandum of September 4) 1935) when it
told the League of Nations that:
The elimination of important chiefs who
wielded an extensive influence in certain regions,
and the substitution of Shoan officials of the
central government for the traditional chiefs,
while failing to strengthen the central govern-
ment's power in the frontier regions, have, at
the same time, disorganized the provincial
administrations and helped to make internal
conditions in Ethiopia even more unstable than
they were in the Emperor Menelik's time.
2
Italy had thus struck at the most appropriate time. Once
the war started various dissatisfied groups who had hitherto
been suppressed by force or threat of force found the chance
to revolt openly. In Gojam a cousin of Ras Hailu whom the
Emperor deposed and imprisoned in 1932 revolted against the
central government just as the war with Italy started, ftas
Imru who was then the governor of that province could not
suppress the rebellion without shifting forces from the front.
Thus the governor had to go to the northern front leaving
the rebellion to take its own course. It was suppressed in
due time but with much waste of effort and troops which could
have been better used against a common enemy.
In Tigrai Dejazmatch Haileselassie Gugsa ruler of the
northern half of the province defected to the Italians with
hence the term "Abyssinia" from the Arabic for mixture. The
rest of the provinces annexed in the Ninteenth Century are
inhabited by Nilotic groups mostly and in some areas by
Hametic people.
p. 1391.
League of Nations Official Journal (November, 1935)
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a force of 10,000 troops. IlailcasclaDslo Cuf^•:,-^ war; embit-
tered towards the Emperor who, in order to avoid the poten-
tial threat of a united Tigrai, divided it and gave half to
Ras Seyoum. The man had hopes of ruling the entire province
and by feudal tradition he had the right since he was the
legitimate grandson of Emperor Johannes IV whose native
province was Tigrai. Haileselassie Gugsa's defection had a
disatrous effect upon the Ethiopian defense plan according
to which the 10,000 troops he commanded were to hold Kekele
with the Army of Ras Seyoum who would join him from the north.
The scheme of defense of the north and consequently of the
entire plan of defense was thus affected.
3
Everywhere subject peoples who were held tyrannically
—
almost to the point of enslavement by the ruling class—felt
that the Italians had come to liberate them. The nomadic
Danakils and Somalis in the south and southeast enlisted as
mercenaries by Italy made the position of the Ethiopian
defenders in those areas higiily insecure. The soldiers had
to defend themselves against native raids and engage in mop-
up operations before meeting the actual enem.y. By then they
had suffered a number of casualities. To engage a strong
enemy after having been exhausted in local engagements vras,
to be sure very demoralizing. The Sultan of Biru and the
i S^teer for example considers that the defection was in
fact fatal to the Emperor's plan of defense. See George
Steer, Caesar in Abyssinia {Boston: Little Brown, 1937)
p. 63.
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Sultan of Ausa both of whom wero rulers of important
sultanates in southeastern Ethiopia submitted to the ' ;
Italians without resistance thereby giving the enemy an
easy foot-hold in this area.
In the north Ras Mulugeta the Ethiopian Minister of V.'ar
after having been defeated at Amba Aradom had retreated to
Amba-Alagie—a key mountain pass where he built a formidable
defense. The Italians also felt that it was indeed formidable
and had thrown everything they had into this attack. But it
was unnecessary. The Galla contingents deserted before the
Italian columns reached the defensive position, thereby,
exposing Ras Mulugeta 's left flank and making it impossible
for the defenders to hold their ground. Ras Mulugata with-
drew without giving battle and Amba Alagie was captured
without a shot. Yet Ifershal Badoglio called it a glorious
achievement. "That mountain which had been lying on our
stomachs has been won,"^ he told the gathered correspondents
pointing towards the direction of Amba Alagie.
After the retreat from Amba Alagie the Ethiopians re-
grouped and fought their last battle on the Northern Front
at Mai Chew. Here too, they were defeated but not destroyed.
They could reorganize and offer another resistance, however,
this was made impossible by the harassing Azebo and Wollo'
^New York Times , February 17, 1936.
'Azebo Gallas lived as they live now in the northern
extreme of Tigrai and the V.'ollo Gallas as their name indicates
are in the province of V.'ollo.
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Gnllas. Thus not only could the Ethiopianr, not roorcianizo
and counterattack but they found it hard to maV.c their re-
treat good due to the sudden raids by the rebellious local
population. As the war progressed the rate of desertion
became extremely high and the consequences ominous. Not
only did they make the Ethiopian position untenable but since
they were now better armed than the Ethiopian troops and had
better knowledge of their areas they inflicted nearly as much
damage as the Italian invaders themselves.
°
There is no more disaster that can befall an army than
to fight against a vastly superior enemy and at the same
time have to defend itself from the people whom it v/as
supposed to protect.
Vahib Pasha a Turkish general who was advisor to the
Ethiopian forces in the South said that in his view the pro-
blem of wholesale desertions was a decisive factor in the
breakdown of the Ethiopian resistance. See Arnold Toynbee,
"Abyssimia and Italy," Survey of Internationa l Affairs Vol. II
1935.
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THE ETHIOPIAN AllMT ON THE EVE
Vv'ritinf^ in 1935 ju^t before the war started, itobert
Woolbert described the Ethiopian army as "an anachronism in
a .world where war has become an intricate science."
The description was very fitting. The Ethiopian feudal
army differed from the Italian Army not only in v;eapons and
mechanized transport but also in quality and organization.
In 1896 the difference between the two antagonists was not
very sharp. V.'hile Italy had more arms, Ethiopia did not
severely suffer from lack of them. In terms of the art of
warfare both, more or less, fought by the old book; that is,
in the classical manner where battle orders took the form of
a modified Phalanx formation. V.'here the difference was not
so great, therefore, the test was one of martial prov.'ess.
But as Woolbert has said, war had become an intricate
science and in the forty or more years that elapsed between
Adua and 1935, Fascist Italy had caught up with the times.
New systems had rendered the old system of warfare useless
—
indeed suicidal. The experience of the French in the early
phase of the First World V.'ar, for example, had amply demon-
strated the fatality of massed attack in the face machine-
guns. Tanks and aircrafts had further neutralized the shock
Robert Gale Woolbert, "Feudal Ethiopia and Her Armies,"
Foreign Affairs (An American Quarterly Review ) (Oct., 1935,
July, 1935 Vol. 14 Kos. 1-14.) p. 77
effect of relentless attack. The art of carc-ifla.'^ing, for-
tification and combat formations had been improved. Thorough
training and good discipline became essential] and this in
turn needed the establishment of a permanent army. V/here
one of the belligerents had modernized its army on these lines
and where the other had not the contest would be like that in
the movie "Zulu."
In Ethiopia little had changed since I896. As was to be
expected of in a feudal system, the bulk of the troops v;as
raised and led by provincial governors. The levy usually
consisted of three types: first, the governor had his own
personal following whom he armed and led in battle. This
type of warrior group usually received land and occassionally
money and lived near or in the household of the governor.
This by Ethiopian standards constituted the professional
soldiery. Indeed, the soldiers themselves felt so, for they
knew they could only win such rare reward of close attachment
to and protection of a great man by the demonstration of their
personal bravery.
The next group of soldiers where those, like the Fyrds
of pre-Norman England, were called in to do service for a
specified time usually two to three months. The third and
largest group, which v/ould only be called in times of national
emergency was the mass levy.
The Emperor for his part, had his own personal following
like the other feudal lords except that in his case his
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position would enable him to support larger number of troop:;.
Also in his case his troops would normally be given some kind
of rudimentary training. Moreover in time of war the Emperor
assumed, at least in theory, the role of the commander-in-
chief of all the armies and the various chiefs and provincial
governors held their posts under him, their rank in the field
depending on their status in normal life.
Vrtien general mobilization was ordered the soldiers v/ere
supposed to provide themselves with food for so many number
of days—depending on the official estimate when the campaign
was expected to be completed. The soldiers ration usually
consisted of flour, dried beans and peas, butter and red
pepper. But this ration seldom lasted for more than few days
and the soldier would, as we have already seen, take to the
countryside. The question of medical care never existed. If
the wounded soldier was lucky, he would make it to the camp
where he would find no treatment in the modern sense, but
where he would be given some traditional aid. In the 1935-
36 war, however, Red Cross organizations from Britain, Sv;eden,
Egypt and others sent help. But because of transport difficul-
ties and lack of adequate personnel they found it hard to cope
with the civilian victims of poison gas and the increasing
military casualties.
V/hen the feudal levies started moving they resembled a
mass of people vacating their village carrying all their
belongings with then as if their village is threatened by
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Hoino natural clJ:;aBtor. Soldjerc marched followod by tr/jn;;-
port mules and slave servants. Depending on the amount of
his wealth, each feudal chief would also have a number of
goats and cattle to be slaughtered in rest camps. The
richer he was the bigger household he would have in his
camp. Yet in spite of the seemingly disorderly manner of
movement confusion in the ranks seldom occured. Each corps
of the army represented a region and followed its traditional
leader, and each person within the various smaller groups
was related to one another by ties of neighborhood or
kinship.
In terms of weapons, the majority of the levy carried
swords and shields. The amount of arms possessed by Ethiopia
in 1935 is not known for certain, but it is estimated that
of the 280,000 troops that were mobilized some 60,000 carried
rifles of all makes. Ir addition there were few hundred machine
guns and a few dozen of cannons, the last being "nothing but
museum pieces."-' '
The enemy was, of course, v;ell equipped and highly
mechanized. Even in sheer numbers Italy had more troops at
the front. According to Ethiopian sources the figure is
given at 875, OOO'* officers and men. But the figure may be
^Ibid
. , p. 78.
•-*The estimate was made by f-Iarshal Badoglio commander-in-
chief of the Invasion Army in his V.'ar in Abyssinia and cited
in Margery Perham, The Governm.ent of Ethiopia (London. Faber
and Faber, 19/f8) p. 166.
^Ethiopia, Liberation Silver Jublee (Addis Abeba:
Publications and r'oreign Languages Press Department, 1966) p. 42.
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misleading since a large number of this included non-
compatants who were mostly engasjod in road buildings. The





Artillery pieces • 2,120
Tanks and carriers 3i700
Infantry rifle rounds 570,000,000
Artillery shells ' 3,071,000
And an undetermined air fleet of several squadrons.
This was a totally different kind of war to which the
Ethiopian soldiers had never been accustomed. In the first
place he had no experience in a protracted war conducted on
wide theaters of operation and on two fronts such as he faced
in 1935. He was never used to counterattacking nor to pur-
suing his beaten enemy. He had developed neither the patience
nor the capacity for a long cam.paign. The longer the cam-
paign lasted the more probleri of obtaining supplies. Then
his war— like enthusiasm—would rapidly diminish. Moreover
it was distasteful to him to remain underarms during the
rainy season. V.T^.at he looked forward to v;as a short campaign
climaxed by resounding victory. If the enemy was once crushed,
the army disintegrated and the troops went home on their own.
Ibid.
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This is what happened in 1875 and I876 when the Ernyptian
armies were decisively defeated at Gundet and at Gura.
The Ethiopians did not exploit their victories with a drive
towards Massawah—the possession of which would have given
land-locked Ethiopia an outlet to the sea. Again after the
Italian defeat at Adua in I896, Eritrea lay open, but the
army feeling its mission accomplished in the destruction of
the enemy simply dishanded. It was only that General
Baratieri who had not quickly recovered from the shock of
the defeat that he did not counter-attack. Had he done so
even with a very small force, there w^s nothing left of
the Ethiopian army to stop his thrust. It had melted away.
Clearly the Ethiopians were ill-prepared to face a
modern army. The only method that they could successfully
use was the guerrilla way of fighting. It would be fool-
hardiness to attack an enemy with vastly superior arms en
mass. Attack had to be done in small bands and preferably
at night v/hen enemy air power would be ineffective. The
invading army would then be forced to employ large detach-
ments to combat small bands. This would have proved expen-
sive to the enemy. Military experts everywhere expecting the
Ethiopians to follow this method predicted that it would be
a long war indeed. The defender had a decided advantage of
mobility on his own ground, whereas a mechanized enemy was
theoretically ill-prepared for a campaign in a country of
mountains and dee? ravines. Emperor Haileselassie who seemed
to have undorstood the futility of encanin;^ tho enemy in
big battles had advised his troopc:
Be cunning, be savacc, face the enemy one
by one, two by two, five by five in the fields
and mountains. Do not take white clothes, do
not mass as now; hide .strike suddenly, fight
the nomad war, steal, snipe, and murder singly.
Today the war has begun, therefore scatter and
advance to victory."
But it is always hard to make a sudden change from an
age-long practice and thus the emperor was unable to restrain
leaders, who following their old habits, disastrously massed
their forces thereby offering an ideal target for enemy
machine gur.s and aerial bombs while they themselves could
not respond in kind.
There vras also an added problem arising out of the age-
long hatred of the soldier by the local population over v/hich
he operated. The army lived on the people. It seldom car-
ried its supplies and if at all they v;ould not last for m.ore
than a few days. After that the feudal levy would form into
groups and order the villagers to prtvide all the food and
drinks demanded.
Emperor Haileselassie while in exile in England admitted
this. He said that "the country folk were ordered under com-
pulsion to give to the soldiers food, grass and wood, supplying
them without payment, "'i' claiming, however, that he himself




'Richard Pankhurst, "Some Factors depressing the Standard
of Living of Peasants in Traditional Ethiopia," Journal of
Ethiopian Studies
.
(July 1966) Vol. IV, No. 2, p. 75.
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had abolished this system. But a problem could not bo solved
by order unless the causes that gave rise to the problem
are solved. When the Kmperor gave his orders not to ravage
the country, the soldier was poorly supplied or not at all.
The result was, as always, that whereever the troops operated
or passed through whole villages were depredated, the local
population impoverished and insulted. The array moved as
Steer observes like a "trail of brown ants eating up every-
thing."^
Caesar in Abyssinia , op. cit
. . p. I37.
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GEOPHYSICAL FACTORS
Physically Ethiopia embraces two major escarpments
—
namely the Northern Plateau and the Southern Slab. The
two escarpments face each other accross the Rift along the
valley of the Awash River. The plateau is inclined north-
eastward reaching an altitude of more than 8000 feet in the
north and abounding with numerous mountains rising occasion-
ally to fifteen thousand feet. The slab on the other hand
slopes dovm southeastward to the Indian Ocean until it
reaches the great desert depression of the Danakil region
and the arid lowlands of Somalia.
Climatically the country can be divided into four zones.
The first is the DEGA or cold zone comprising all land above
8000 feet. It includes the northern part of the Plateau as
well as some isolated regions in the northern section of the
slab where the land rises abruptly. Here the annual mean
temperature varies between 40 to 60 degrees Farenheit. To
the Italian invaders coming from southern Europe it does not
afford suitable climate. Cattle and sheep prosper here as
pasture is available all year round.
The next is the VffilNA DEGA or Temperate Zone consisting
of the Plateau between 4,800 and 8,000 feet and with an
annual mean temperature varying from 60 to 68 degrees. A
large part of the plateau and the upper basins of the Juba





Physical Feature of Ethiopia
,,, ,.
Source: Taken from H. Scaetta, "Geography Ethiooia';
.Ally Foreign Affair.^ XIX Kos I-I4 {October, 1935- July,
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^?-,i'^. J- , - --,1-
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Tropical fore;;ts abound and in somo places throe crops could
be harvested in a year. The region is ideal for such
Mediterranean fruits as citrus and grapes as well as cereals.
It is also the most suitable place for European settlement.
The third, KOLLA or hot, zone lies between 2,500 and
/t,SOO feet with an annual mean temperature varying betv/een
68 and 77 degrees. In the higher parts of this belt coffee
is grovra. The land is rich and could be made richer still
by irrigation since it does not get adequate rain. Sugar
cane and cotton can be grovm in the lower part of this belt.
It is less suitable for European habitation than the V/EIKA
DEGA, but its economic importance to Italy was great. Staples
such as cotton, which Italy lacked, could, for example, be
exploited here.
Lastly, we have the intensly hot lowland regions v/ith a
mean annual temperature of over 86 degrees. It is a desert
tract of practically no economic value and inhabited by
turbulent nomadic tribes.
Italy, on her part, was also in possession of parts of
the plateau and the slab. Her colony of Eritrea formed the
northern extremety of the plateau and Italian Somaliland in
the south formed the southeastern edge of the slab. In
itself Eritrea was of small economic value, as agriculturally
or otherv;ise it produced little. Its chief economic value to
Italy was, thus, in the fact that it controlled the principal
outlet for the trade of Northern Ethiopia. However, it
70
affords suitable tempcrnt'ure for settlement except of course,
for the coastal ronion which is oxtromoly hot. Militarily
it was important because it provided Italy a foothold on the
Ethiopian Plateau. Moreover, by virtue of her possession of
a pood part of the Red Sea Coast Italy could get a stran^^le-
hold on the Red Sea through East-West sea traffic by blockad-
ing the Eab-el-Kandeb—the narrow neck of the sea.
Italian Somaliland was different fror. Eritrea in that
the forir.er was semi-desert. The inhabitants vjere mostly
nomadic subsisting by primitive agriculture and pasturing.
The only hope in this region were the JUBA and the WABI
SHEBELI Rivers v;hose ivaters could reclaim adjoining lands.
Otherwise there was little that could be desired of Italian
Somaliland in terms of economiy. Mlitarily , however, it
offered a, base from whence Italy could launch a mechanized
attack against Ethiopia.
For Mussolini, there were tv;o considerations which
governed his plans to Invade Ethiopia. The first, of course,
was economic. But he was also driven by the need for a
geographical consolidation of his possessions. If Ethiopia
could be annexed Eritrea and Italian Somaliland v/hich had been
hitherto isolated could have been united and an Italian East
African Empire created.
In accordance with this aim Italy attacked on two fronts
—
from its Eritrean base in the north and Som.aliland base in
the south. The Fascist armies advancing from opposite
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directions were eventually to join hands at Addin Ataba.
The two lines of approach differed from each other in climate
and topography.
The only practical route open for an invader approaching
from the north was along the brow of the eastern escarpment
of the plateau--a mountain ridge with a mean height of 7,000-
8,000 feet running north and south- The right side of the
ridge is cut by deep revines and on the left lies the burning
Danakill depression. Swerving either left or right meant
falling into these natural obstacles. Thus if the enemy
wished to avoid this he would have to engage every line of
defense on the brow of the escarpment by frontal attacks.
Ordinarily the defender who was supposed to have an
advantage of mobility in his own mountainous habitat v/as
expected to put up a stiff resistance even with the moderate
arms he had. Many observers had anticipated this. A
Scaetta, for one, writing before hostilities opened felt that
"the Ethiopians can organize virtually impregnable positions
for defense or for hurrying the enem.y's rear."
Militarily speaking the observation would be correct if
other factors did not intervene. As' it happened the natural
advantages on which the Ethiopian fighter had depended for so
long had now been stripped away from him by the advent of
modern technology. Italian engineers were able to construct
-"-A. Scaetta, "Geography— Ethiopia's Ally," Foreign
Affairs , op . cit .
, p. 68.
''''
serviconble rond;; with amazing speed, ftorcover, the aor'*-plan!;
pursued the dcfcndcra over hill and dale droppin/'; poinon ;',as
and bombs. All these had turned the scale af,ainst any ill-
equipped army, but in the case of Ethiopia, the situation
was worsned by the defenders themselves. Instead of taking
cover in the abundant shelters which nature had provided,
they massed themselves in large groups in the open; instead
of disrupting the construction of roads and harassing the
enemy in small bands they allowed themselves to be drawn
into big battles. Thus through their own lack of ingenuity
the Ethiopian defenders failed to maintain their superior
mobility, and once they forfeited that in their own country,
their military power was hamstrung.
The Italians were expected to meet with yet another dif-
ficulty. Thus v;henever rain fell, the Italian advance would
have to be halted, for in addition to the virtual non-
existence of roads rainfall would immobilize wheeled trans-
port, while the Ethiopian army by virtue of its light equip-
ment, modest necessity and marching endurance would be able
to harass its immobilized enemy at will. As it turned out,
however, the contrary was true. The Italian engineers suc-
cessfully constructed roads that could withstand rain. Kore-
over aircraft were used as a supplementary means of supply
transportation. On the other hand the Ethiopians who depended
on primitive tracks found it difficult to maintain constant
communication. Vv'henever heavy rain fell rivers, great and
»5r^^«^
Email, became raging torrents and dictricts v/ere cut off
from one another by impassable waters. Thus the climate
proved to be in favor of the motorized and airborne invader
rather than the defenders.
The topography of the sourthern front is markedly dif-
ferent from the northern one. Here the land is generally
flat gradually rising towards the north. In this region of
sand and scrub full use could be mace of mechanized transport
and tank warfare so long as there was no rain. But once
rain falls the soil turns into a soapy paste making passage,
even on foot, very difficult. The rain which comes in dovm-
pours compresses rather than penetrates the soil so that
motorized transport especially vehicles of hugh tonnage
would be immobilized. Here road making requires stone
foundation and the clearance of a sea of sand which is blown
back by wind and covers the road anyhow. If the war on this
front could not end before October, when the rainy season
begins in this region, the campaign would necessarily have
to be halted until the end of the rains. But was P'lussolini
prepared to sustain a long campaign?
Another disadvantage that the enemy had to overcome on
this front was the heat and scarcity of water. The only way
of overcoming the problem of water was to keep close to the
JUEA and V/ABI SKEBELI Rivers. But only one column could take
that approach and others had to advance through waterless
desert. Several columns of the enemy had thus to traverse
?/.
a two-hundred-mile belt of barren lands before reachin;^
water wells at VMLV.'AL, GEiiLE GUBI and other such points.
The odds, however, were decidedly ap;ainst the defender
on this front. To bep;in with the Ethiopian troops v;ere
caught in a position where natural cover was unavailable and
thus tanks and aeroplanes pounded him with deadly effective-
ness. In matters of mobility the situation had become like
the story of the Hare and the Tortoise except that in this
case the Hare was no fool.
Moreover, an army without a planned supply system could
not operate on a desert where leaving on the countryside was
out of the question. Still more the highlander was poorly
suited for a war in such lowland regions. His ineffective-
ness had already been seen in 1898. At this time an
Ethiopian expeditionary force was sent to the Valley of the
Nile to occupy Eastern Sudan which Emperor Menelik had long
coveted. Actually the expedition was sent under the encour-
agement of the French ostensibly to help Ethiopia, but in
fact the French intension was to use the force as a protectory
guard against any attempt by the British to reach the Nile
from the south. Then French forces under Marchand who had
been approaching from the west coast of Africa would be able
to occupy the Nile Valley as far as Fashoda and thus carve
out for France a North African Empire. Nevertheless, an
Ethiopian expeditionary force did set out to the claimed ter-
ritory and on June 20, 1898 reached the Nile Valley where the
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Sohat River meets the White Nile. But the soldiers could
not stand the climatic conditions of the region. It soon
became evident that they could not maintain their position
and thus a withdrawal had to be ordered. Diseases, heat'
and low altitude overcame the highlander and defeated his
purpose. " .-- -
THE CONDUCT OF THE V/AR
The Northern Front
At 5 a.m. on October 3, 1935, General De Bono's armies
crossed the Ethiopian boundary at the Mereb River and ad-
vanced in three columns. The center column consisting of
the Indigenous Army Corps (Colonial troops) commanded by
General Pirzio Biroli pushed towardsi Entitcho. The left
column— the First Army Corps under General Sanfini—took
the Sen'afe'-Adigrat-Kekele Road. And on the right the
Second Army Corps advanced on Adua. De Bono's plan was to
capture Adua first and while the occupation of this town
had not much military benefit yet it had a tremendous polit-
ical significance on the eyes of the Italian public who now
felt that the humiliating defeat in 1396 was at last avenged.
After the capture of Adua the right column was to proceed to
Axum—the historic capital and religious center of Ethiopia.
From there it would continue its advance to Gondar— another
historically significant town. The capture of Axum and
Gondar would, the Italian strategists felt, cause a morale
breakdown in the Ethiopians.
The Center V/ing advancing from Entitcho and Hawzien
would eventually make contact with the First Army Corps and
march southward to Addis Ababa.
By November 8th, De Bono's forces had occupied the greater
part of Tigrai. Adua, Axum, Adigrat, Mekele, Norther Tembien
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and portions of Eastern Shire had fallen almost v/ithout
resistance. De Bono had expected Has Seyoum to put up a
fifht at Adua but the Ras retreated the night before the
Italinas entered the town. The whereabouts of Ras Seyour. v/as
not inunediately known to De Bono. In fact he did not know
where the whole of the Ethiopian forces were located. This
did not deter De Bono from extending his occupation boldly.
In so doing he neglected the military consideration that with
each extension the area under his occupation became vast.
His armies had, thus, to spread more widely and so more
thinly.
But the Ethiopians did not make use of De Bono's weak-
ness. Up to this time the Ethiopians did not confront their
enemy, and it was a wise move since to attack three heavily
equipped army corps within supporting distance of one another
would have proved suicidal. But once the enemy had spread
out so thinly the defenders best chance lay in making massed
attacks on the separate dispositions. This, the Ethiopians
failed to do. On the contrary they allowed the enemy to con-
solidate his gains and waited quietly until he felt ready to
attack them.
Regardless of De Bono's fast and bold advance 'lussolini
did not think that the v/ar was going fast enough. Thus three
days after the capture of Kekele he cabled De Bono ordering
hin to proceed without delay and capture Amba Alagie.
Angelo Del Boca, La Guerra d'Abissinia 1935-19i^l
.
(Milan:
Feltrinelli Editors, 1966) 2nd ed. p. 53.
Mussolini's order sprung from the belief that at Araba Alap;ie
(a vital mountain fortress commanding the only good passage
to the south) Ethiopian forces were strengthening their
defenses. Hence they had to be thrown back before they
were firmly entrenched. But De Bono had already overstretched,
his forces and was not willing to take any hasty steps that
might endanger the whole operation. His moto had now become
"safety first" and advance gradually and in irresistible
strength. Thus after occupying an area he would order a
halt, organize his communication and consolidate his forces.
He was also careful not to interfere with the normal life of
the people of the occupied territories. This type of operation
although evidently slow nevertheless pacified the people and
thus made it difficult for the Ethiopian counter-offensive.
Moreover, in I896, the Italians made a frenzied dash on the
very same place and had lost. De Bono did not v/ant to repeat
it.
Mussolini was in a hurry however; and he was not going
to risk speed for safety. At that time the League of Nations
was considering economic sanctions against Italy, and if im-
posed— even partially—the Fascist troops in Ethiopia would
be faced with considerable difficulties. Time was thus a
factor of the utmost importance. On November 15, De Bono was
replaced by Marshal Pietro Badoglio as commander-in-chief of
^Although Badoglio was officially commander-in-chief of
all the Italian armies, General Graziani, commanding the
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Rsversinp: De Bono's rriethod of relative fairness to the
populations of the occupied territories Badoglio "staked his
fortunes on obtaining quick returns by an intensive campaign
of totalitarian frightfulness. " During De Bono's command
the Italian air arm was used against troop movements, military
installations and for reconnaissance missions, though occas-
sionally it was used against civilian centers as v/ell. But
no poison gas was sprayed even against military targets.
V/hen Badoglio took over he used his air power to the maximum.
Aeroplanes rained poison gas and high explosives against
military as well as innocent civilians. Ironically it v;as
Badoglio— a non-Fascist, v;ho, for the first tim.e used poison
gas which the Fascist De Bono refrained from using.
^
Yet after several weeks of strenuous effort Badoglio had
not made much headway. In fact during the early days of his
command his armies suffered several reverses. For some time
it seemed as though the Italians had no chance of winning.
The Ethiopian Rorthern armies had by this time occupied three
main defense positions. On the left were Ras Immiru's forces
operating in the Shire district through which the Italian
right column had to pass if it were to capture Gondair. In
the center the armies of Ras Kassa and Ras Seyoum had
armies on the Southern Front was for all practical purposes
independent of Badoglio.
3 Toynbee, orv. clt
. , p. 369.
^Del Boca, o£. cit .
, p. 54.
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entrenched themselves in the rupf^ed terrain in the Tenbien
district. At Amba Aradom another fortress controllin?; the
Mekele-Addis Ababa road was occupied by Ras Kulugeta—an
Adua veteran novj Minister of V/ar.
So far there had been little activity on the Ethiopian
side. Now aggressive tactics started against all Italian
dispositions. On the night of the 3rd and 4th December the
enemy position at Shelikot , South of I^^ekele, v;as attacked
with considerable losses to the enemy. The right wing was
also attacked on the 15th by detachments of Ras Immuru's
forces. Italian outposts on the Tekeze River v/ere routed.
In another engagement at the Dembaguina Pass they were forced
to retreat. All in all the Italian right wing had lost
twenty kilometers of ground.
In the center too the Ethiopians succeeded in penetrating
the center of the Italian line near the town of Abiyi Adi. The
town itself was soon recaptured. By this success the Ethiop-
ians were nov; placed in a position to threaten the Adigrat-
Mekele road which was under Italian control. From, the left
it was already open to the forces of Dejazmatch Kassa Sebhat
still at large northeast of Mekele, and from the right it
lay open to the forces of Ras Kassa and Ras Seyoum who were
now in control of the Adua-Adigrat road.
At the beginning of Badoglio's command neither his flanks
nor his lines communication was secure. With their main comi-
munication line thus cut off the Italian armies would have
•^ ..':'::^^- GAGA
^Z'^^^.
Ethiopian Defense Organization on the Northern Front
Source: Del Boca
been immobilized by their own weights and aisabled to cope
with continued ''pin prick" attacks which, in view of the
high altitude, would have proved particularly trying to
Italian nerves. But the Ethiopians fought according to the
antique idea that wars must be decided in pitched battles.
It did not occur to them that where it v;as impossible to win
in pitched battles, it might be possible to do so by re-
peated hit-and-run raids at separate enemy positions.
Badoglio had now become aware of the unfavorable situation
he was in and ordered a halt to consolidate his gains and
improve his lines of communication, while roads were being
built and the enemy left column reinforced by the arrival of
the Third Army Corps. The Ethiopians waited almost without
concern. Thus when 'Eadoglio resumed his drive the Ethiopian
attempt to stop him was destined to fail since he was now
fighting from an improved strategic position.
Apart from the many minor skirmishes five main battles
were fought and lost in the Northern Front.
The First Battle of Tembien
It will be remembered that De Bono's Central Coltimn had
advanced as far as the Tembien district capturing Abiyi Addi-
its capital. However, the greater part of the district was
still in Ethiopian hands and in the southern part--a terrain
of rugged mountains and deep ravines—were the forces of Ras
Seyoum and Ras Kassa. On the 22nd of December these forces
'^ll;^'*^''
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The First Battle of Tembien
Source: Del Boca
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launched a counter offensive against the Italian hold ter-
ritory in the district. The battle was indicisive in that
the Italians were not driven out completely, but tho enemy
had been forced to abandon Abiyi Addi . By January 9> 1936,
Ras Seyoum regained almost all Terabien.
The First Battle of Tembien, (that is the first major
battle) began on the 19th of January and lasted until the
23rd. The attack which was initiated by the Italians v;as
executed in the following manner. The Third Amy Corps v;as
to close the gap between Ras Mulugeta and Ras Kassa in order
to stop the former from rushing reinforcem.ents to the latter.
The actual attack against Ras Kassa' s and Ras Seyoum'
s
positions was entrusted to the Blackshirt Division (28
Cttobre) and the Eritrean Division. For five days fierce
attacks and counter attacks raged, and having suffered heavy
casualties the Italians finally fell back. But from a military
point of view the battle was neither a loss to the Italians
nor a gain to the Ethiopians. Due to lack of adequate arms
the defenders did not dare to leave their natural sanctuaries
and occupy the area vacated by the retreating enemy. Indeed
the occupation of this open ground by the ill-equipped Ethiop-
ian troops would have provided the enemy with the opportunity
of mowing them down with air, artillery and raachinegun fire.
In this battle, the nature of the ground and the fact that
it was fought between sm.all groups over an extensive area
had restricted the use of the Italian artillery and air arm.
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The First Battle of Tembien was thus fought on more or less
equal footing.
The Battle of Araba Aradom
But at the Battle of Amba Aradom the Ethiopians v;ere
decidedly at a disadvantage. Badoglio had put every ounce
of his might into this operation. Seventy thousand Italian
troops supported by 170 aeroplanes, 280 heavy guns and
thousands of automatic weapons were employed against an
estimated 80,000 defenders armed v/ith few machineguns, rifles
and swords.'
One wonders why in the first place, Marshall Badoglio
did not attack Amba Aradom rather than Tembien. Militarily
this seemed to be the better choice. Amba Aradom is a high
mountain with sheer sides, rearing its head to a height of
10,000 feet. It v;as a formidable natural fortress dominating
the Enderta region and controlling the only possible line of
approach to Addis Ababa as well as the only good passage to
Tembien. V/ith Amba Aradom in their hand the Italians could
entrap Ras Seyoum and Ras Kassa from the rear. Badoglio
used this manuever after he lost in the First Battle of
5 These figures are taken from Del Boca, Ibid .
, p. 115.
The sam.e figures were reported in The Iv'ew York Times Feb-
ruary. 17, 1936. As for statistics in regard to the Ethiopian
side one, has to rely on estimates. Because of the feudal
system of Ethiopian army organization nobody, including the
Ethiopians themselves, knew for sure how many troops partici-
pated in the vrar or how many casualities there ivere in the
entire campaign. Much less can one hope to knov/ the statistics
of individual battles. Sim.ilarly the number of weapons and
their types possessed by the Ethiopians is hard to know.
Tembien. If he tried Amba Aradom first he might not have
lost the battle in Temtien.
Nevertheless, the advance on Amba Aradom began on
February 11, with two columns moving simultaneously from
opposite directions with the view to squeezing Ras Kulugeta
in a pincer. The main attack begun Tuesday, February 15,
193^, at 8 o'clock. Under the cover of artillery barrages
of 1/j9 1C5s and as many 75s as well as air bombardments from
170 aeroplanes the two army corps advanced. The Third Array
Corps advancing from the right was divided into two with the
Sabauda Division turning right in order to hold a prominent
position on the eastern ridge of the Amba. The remainder of
the Corps continued to Antalo to close the only gap left
through which Ras Mulugeta might retreat. The First Army
Corps moving from the left also split into two with the
(January 3rd) Blackshirt Division turning left and climbing
the western end of Amba Aradom to hold a prominent mound.
Up to this time Ras Mulugeta did nothing to stop
Badoglio's advance. Ey waiting placidly v;hen the enemy was
closing on him under hazardous conditions Kulugeta committed
a grievous blunder. Because of the mountainous nature of the
area the Italian flanking troops lost contact with each other
and thus coordination had become difficult. Later Marshal
Badoglio praised his troops for their "perfect discipline.
^Del Boca, Ibid .
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order and speed across extremely difficult terrain."' Strictly
the praise was not due, since a well trained modern arny could
not be expected to lose discipline in crossing a difficult
terrain especially if it encountered no harassment or challenge
while doing so. The point is, that if Has Kulugeta had hit
hard at one flank, then at the other he could have made it
difficult for Badoglio to capture the fortress. At any rate,
he ^lOuld have fought his way out by attacking one of the flanks
before it was too late. As it happened he did nothing of the
sort. Apparently he did not think that the enemy would attack
him from two sides. But even after realizing that he was
being encircled he did not retreat before his position became
useless.
Now that he saw the Italian method of attack he divided
his forces into two positions facing the two Italian vdngs.
He attached more importance to the enemy's right flank since
it was trying to catch him from the rear and cut off his line
of communication. But this Italian column which was expected
the next day was immobilized by rain and was one day late.
Seeing no enemy coming and discouraged by the bomibardments the
Ethiopians withdrew from this position so that when the column
appeared one day later they were completely surprised. They
hastly threw their force but it was too late. The enemy had
captured the contested position with only nine casualities.
7The Mew York Times
, February 17, 1936.
^Ibid.
i'J
Thus, though not by design, the Italians had executed a
tactical master stroke.
VvTiile this was happening on the Italian right flank,
the {January 3rd) Black Shirt Division was engaged in a
bitter fight. Only when two Alpani battalions were rushed up
did the Ethiopians retreat fighting step by step.
Apart from Ras Mulugeta's tactical inaptitude the com-
plete absence of mutual assistance between neighboring forces
was another problem which the Ethiopians had at the Battle
of Amba Aradom and generally in all battles. Emperor
Haileselassie had ordered the troops in Tembien to reinforce
Mulugeta, but neither could they have arrived in time (the
order being given too late) nor v;ere they willing to go out
of their natural defense positions and expose themselves to
enemy superior arms. Above all they were unaccustomed to
the idea of mutual support. In the First Battle of Tembien,
for example, neither Ras Immiru on the left nor Ras Kulugeta
on the right sent reinforcements or tried to weaken the
enemy's strength by harassing his flanks. In fact even in
Tembien itself Ras Kassa's and Ras Seyoum's forces did not
operate in close cooperation. The enemy dealt with one and
then with the other separately. At Amba Aradom it was the
same, as it was the same at the Battle of Shire discussed
below. Because the Ethiopians neglected or were unaware of
this essential military consideration, the enemy had the rare
opportunity of isolating and defeating them, separately.
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At the Battle of Amba Aradom the Ethiopians had suffered
the most decisive defeat of the Northern Front. Not only
was Ras Kulugeta's array the largest of the Ethiopian armies
but it was the best in quality. Viliatever modern troops—or
rgther an approximation of modern troops—Ethiopia had were
the Imperial Guards and these were beaten here. This battle
was indeed a turning point in the Ethiopian fortune. It
served a shattering blow to the defenders' morale and hastened
the disintegration of the resistance. Indeed they did not
lose this battle due to their military inability. They had,
in fact, fought so admirably that an Italian general v/as
moved into paying "glowing homage to them and took off his
hat in symbolical tribute to a great foe.''
But the cold fact was, they had lost the battle. They
also lost 6,000 dead and twice as many wounded, according to
Italian estimates. Enemy casualties on the other hand were
low. His dead and wounded consisted of 36 officers, 621
national troops and 145 Eritreans. -''-' The reir.nants of Mulugeta's
vanquished army had fought their way through Antalo towards
Amba Alagie—another natural fortress farther south.
The Second Battle of Tembien
In regard to the situation of the Ethionian forces in
9lbiQ
10.Del Boca, on, cit
. , p. 123.
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-—T.he--Second Battle of, Tembien-
Source: Del Eoca
Temblen after the Battle of Amba Aradom Eadoglio cabled Ror.e,
Caught in a vise by our troops the situ-
ation of the Ethiopian forces is becoming hour
by hour even nore critical. '-'
To be sure it was. While Badoglio was assiduously laying
strategic traps the two Ethiopian leaders—Kassa and Seyoun
waited calmly. Then the trap shut on them from two sides.
From the south the Third Army Corps, and from the north the
Eritrean Army Coros closed on the Ethiopian defenses in
Tembien. The defenders were completely cut off. Reinforce-
ment from the southeast (that is from the remnants of Has
Mulugeta ' s army) could not be had since now the entire area
west of Amba Aradom was in Italian hand. Help from Ras
Immira (located to the west in the Shire region) v;as also
im.possible because the territory between Tembien and southern
Shire was held by the Italian Second and Fourth Army Corps.
It was clear that unless the Ethiopian troops in Tembien-
retreated through the only remaining passage in the South-
west in the direction of Secotta, they would be sandwiched
between the two Italian army corps. Like Ras Kulugeta, the
two Rases waited until it was too late.
In the meantime the First Army Corps had commenced its
southward advance to Amba Alagie were Ras Mulugeta had now
entrenched himself. Seeing the futility of the effort to
11Quoted in The New York Times
.
Kiarch 1, 1936.
block enemy advance in divided strength the Erapsror ordered
Has Iimiiru in Shire and Ras Kassa and oeyoura in Terr.bien to
abandon their positions and hurry to Amba Alagie to reinforce
Ras Mulugeta. But again the order came too late. The
Italians with their wheeled transportation had reached Amba
Alagie before the Ethiopians even started the march. Speed
was of paramount importance here and the army which marched
on foot could not have it. So Bac'oglio occupied two prominent
positions overlooking Amba Alagie. He had expected a tough
resistance and had thus prepared an elaborate attack plan
against this formidable position. There was no need for all
this elaboration however. As the Italians were advancing
against Mulugeta his Galla contingents deserted at the last
moment leaving his left flank exposed. Consequently he v;as
forced to retreat without giving battle. Amba Alagie was,
thus, occupied without a shot.
'.."hile this was happening at Amba Alagie the Second Battle
of Tembien was being fought. On the night of February 26,
1936, a small selected force consisting of experienced m^oun-
tain climbers scaled the western ana eastern peaks of Amba
.'.'ork where Dejazmatch Beyene's troopfe were deployed. Amba
'A'ork is a precipitous mountain with two peaks of almost equal
height projecting out on the west and the east. In between
is a hollow saddle-like formation and here slept Beyene's




forces certain that they were in a secured poEition. The
exact number of the Ethiopians at this position v;as not
known, but The New York Tinea correspondent described thera
as several thousand. -^ At any rate as they slept the
experienced Italian mountain climbers had reached the two
peaks. In the morning the Ethiopians were surprised to find
the enemy climbing down upon them. At first they were con-
fused but regaining their spirit struck back with ferocity
and courage. While they were dealing with these the Eritrean
Army Corps launched a frontal attack on their position. Mow
they were caught between the hammar and the anvil, so to
speak. This was an admirable attack on the part of the
Italians. Indeed
It \islS a manoevre of the Ethiopians' ov;n
book and accomplished with a cat like precision
that the natives themselves could not have
surpassed. I't
After two days of stiff fighting enemy artillery and air
bombardment finally overvjhelmed the defenders. Amba V/ork
was captured on the 27th. In this engagement an estimated
3,000 casualties were sustained by the Ethiopians. -^ Italian




-"^ The Hew York Times , March 2, 1936.
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"^Ibid.




The capture of Amba V/ork had made the defenders' situ-
ation critical. On the 28th the Ethiopians made a desperate
attack on '.v'ereyu Pass but were repulsed v;ith heavy losses.
Although Abiyi Addi was not, as yet, taken by the Italians,
the defeat at Amba Work and "iv'eroyu opened the way to the town.
On February 29, the Third and the Eritrean Army Corps ap-
proaching from opposite directions reached Abiyi Addi and
the final round of the Second Battle of Tembien had started.
On the same day the battle was over. The Ethiopians had
fou/Tht and finally yielded to the inevitable. Ras Kassa and
Ras Scyoum retreated in the direction of Secotta. V.'ith the
Tembien "sore" now relieved and the threat to his left flank
overcome it remained for Badoglio to wrestle with Ras Immiru
in Shire.
The Battle of Shire -, . -.)',-
After the Second Battle of Tembien, the Second and Fourth
Italian Army Coros converged on Ras Immiru. Preparations
for the attack had been going on since the 27th, but actual
operation started on the 29th—the day the battle in Tembien
was won. The attack consisted of tv;o simultaneously moving
army corps aiming to catch Immiru from two sides. The Fourth
Army Corps advancing from Eritrea marched southward over a
roadless and difficult terrain. The Second Army Corps ad-
vanced west from its base around Axum. However, the Fourth
Army Corps did not reach its objective the same day as the
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Second, because it was delayed by the difficult terrain it
has to cross. It was General Maravigna's Second Army Corps
(consisting of 30,000 men^'^) that first made contact with
Ras Immiru's forces. Unlike Kassa, Seyoum and Mulugeta, Ras
Imrairu did not wait idly until he was encircled. As soon as
•the Second Army Crops reached Selekleka he sent out detach-
ments who fiercely engaged its left flank. Moreover he
fought with better speed and skill than the other Ethiopian
commanders on this front. By attacking in waves of fast
moving small groups he denied the enemy the easy target v;hich
the other commanders offered him. The Second Army Corps was
thus pinned down and it took some days before the enemy could
gain the initiative. When he did hov;ever, he was able to
push Immiru back. But the Ethiopians did not suffer much
from this push. Realizing that the odds were against him Ras
Immiru retreated to a better defensive position. It was after
this that he committed the error v/hich the other Ethiopian
commanders had committed and which he had hitherto avoided.
After the push back General Maravigna again took a pause to
consolidate his position; and the Ethiopian commander satis-
fied that the enem.y was not persuing him sat idly in his new
defensive position. By this time the Fourth Army Corps had
joined hands with the Second. Like the others in Tembien
and Am,ba Aradom his position was surrounded and the only way
17Ibid
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so far uncontrolled by the enemy was the v;estern sector of
the circle through which he eventually made his retreat.
The pressure from two army corps as well as concentrated
artillery and air bombardments finally broke Immiru's re-
sistance.
But the defeat was, in any case, inescapable. Surely,
an enemy that had crushed almost the entire northern defensive
positions could hardly be expected to be defeated by one re-
maining portion of an army that had been destroyed piecemeal.
After the Battle of Shire the road to Gondar was laid open.
From then onv/ards the Italian columns met no serious resis-
tance in their drive to that tovm.
The Battle of Mai Chew
This v/as the last battle fought on the Northern Front.
In Ethiopia this battle is considered the most decisive not
only of this Front but of the entire war. Ethiopian histor-
ians speak of Mai Chew as a Frenchman speaks of '.'.'aterloo.
The date of the battle is officially observed every year.
But, in actuality, the war was lost at Amba Aradom when the
biggest and the best Ethiopian army was defeated. It was
not only a military defeat it was also a psychological defeat.
Since that battle the Ethiopians had lost their will and were
fighting a hopeless war. Iz. required the Second Battle of
Tembien and the Battle of Shire to confirm this fact. The
importance of Mai Chew is exaggerated probably because the
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Emporor personally conducted the Battle. Othervace it v;as
no more than a formidable holding operation. Keither could
it he justified as holding operation either since there v;as
no m.ain body in the rear for whose benefit this might be
conducted. In short the Battle of Mai Chow was superfluous.
It only succeeded in having more Ethiopians killed gallantly
but in vain.
Devoid of rational purpose though it was the battle, in
itself was big and bloody. After the defeat of Has Hulugeta
the Emperor had moved his headquarters from Dessie to Korem.
The Ethiopian forces which the Emperor now personally comrrianded,
were concentrated on the southern side of Lake Ashenge and
around Korem.
Employing his usual method Marshal Badoglio advanced in
pincer movement. The First Arm.y Corps and detachm.ents of the
Eritrean Arm.y Corps approached along the edge of the plateau
and by the end of March 1936,' reached Mai Chew a town few
miles north of Lake Ashenge. The Third Army Corps starting
from around Abiyi Addi followed the caravan route to Secotta
—
an important junction where caraban routes from Abiyi Addi on
the north, Addis Ababa from the south and Dessie from the
southeast converged. In addition to the fear that the
Ethiopians might he caught in the teeth of the pincer there
was the additional danger that their line of retreat being
cut off by the Italian forces operating in the southeast. On
March 11, 1936, Italian troops had entered Sardo—the seat of
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Sultan of Auca who accepted the invadors v/ithout renlEtancc.
It was these enemy troops that might make a thrust from the
rear. As far as the thrust was concerned it was improbable
because the area between Ausa and Mai Chew was very difficult
for such operation. First the enemy had to traverse a
desert region, then a rugged mountains region which v;as under
Ethiopian control. Nevertheless the occupation of Sardo, in
itself, was strategically important to the Italians. Since
the town was about 100 miles from the Addis Ababa— Jibuti
railway line and about the same distance from Dessie it
served as a base from where Italian aeroplanes conducted
raids behind the Ethiopian troops, thus disrupting their com-
munication and supply lines.
I'iirshal Badoglio's plan was to attack the Ethiopian
1 ^
army south of Lake Ashenge on the 5th of April. But the
Emperor invalidated that plan by moving north quickly and
striking at the First Army Corps at 'lai Chew. In this battle
31,000 Ethiopian troops consisting of 20,000 local irregulars
and 11,000 of the remnants of Ras Kassa's and Ras Seyoum's
troops were posed against 40,000 Italians."^'
On March 31, the Ethiopians attacked the enemy position
at Mai Chew but Badoglio was not taken by surprise. Already








his troops had been dug-in in hastily prepared defense
positions. Hence though in the face of withering artillery
and machinegun fires the Ethiopians penetrated some of the
enemy defences. They were eventually repulsed. Attacks
and counter attacks raged for six days and on April U, the
battle was over. In this battle the Ethiopians had fought
not only with courage but with also such skill and speed
that even their assailants could not hide their appreciation.'^
But, as always, they finally succu.T.bed before the inexhaustible
enemy fire power and thus, lost the battle through no fault
of theirs.
The last battle on the Northern Front was fought and
lost. The remnants of the Ethiopian army fled in disorder,
pursued by every available enemy aeroplane and harassed by
rebellious Azebo C-allas. The Italian victory of P-iai Chew
removed all obstacles from Eadoglio's advance southward.
The Emperor himself was in flight headed for Jersalem and
then to England. On May 5, 1936, Marshal Badoglio entered
Addis Ababa—the Ethiopian capital and the occupation of the
country which was to last five years almost to the day had
begun.
The Southern Front
While Eadoglio's northern forces were advancing in force
on
^^The New York Times
. March 5, 1936.
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and under the cover of concentrated artillery and air bor.-
bardments, General Rodolfo Graziani conraander-in-chiei of
the Italian armies on the Southern Front vias dashing north-
ward with his comparitively smaller motorized units.
Because of the open nature of the terrain full use could
be made of tanks and aeroplanes. Thus in view of the fact
that this area was suitable for a mechanized war, Graziani
was expected to advance faster and reach Addis Ababa before
Badoglio. But Graziani had many difficulties.
21The 80,000 troops that he commanded at the beginning
of the invasion had to be deployed over a 400 mile front.
Kence a concentrated thrust was not possible. Moreover the
rain which began about the middle of October and continued
sparodically till early December turned the sand into a swamp
thus hampering mechanized transport and making contact be-
tween the scattered forces difficult.
Graziani 's objective was first, to capture Karar and
the railway station at Oire Dawa and then proceed to Addis
Ababa to join hands with the northern armies. But he had a
long way to go and many obstacles to overcome before he could
reach Harar.
The Ethiopian Sourthern armies were deployed in the
following manner: on the highlands of the Bale region—that
is the area between the Genale Doria, Dawa and V/ebi rivers,



























Ras Desta Damte had taken up defensive positions with his
main forces concentrated around Negelle. On the left the
army of Dejazmatch Nessibu had been deployed around Gigjip:a
with several strong detachments spread throughout the Ccaden
region. In between these two another smaller force under
Dejazmatch Beyene Merid was located at Imi in the Bale region
not very far from Ras Desta 's right flank.
General Graziani launched his invasion in four simul-
taneously m.oving columns. In the northeast of Ogaden a small
unit moved parallel with the frontier line between Ethiopia
and the British Somaliland. Its object being to cut off the
caravan route from Berbera through which the Ethiopians im-
ported some amm.unition. However, this unit soon came to a
halt presumably because of lack of water and difficulties
in maintaining contact with the main body. On the left
Graziani immediately occupied Dole— a town which was hitherto
half Ethiopian, half Italian. This was to be the base from
where the drive against Ras Desta would be launched. However,
the column did not start operation immediately. The third
and fourth columns were directed against the various defense
positions in the Ogaden and eventually against the Ethiopian
m.ain forces in the vicinity of Gigjiga. One of the two--which
v;as the main column—advanced from the center, first, along
the V.'ebi Shebelli River and then along the Fafan River. The
fourth column crossed the border at V/al V.'al and moved tov;ards
Gelegubi— a village with several water wells. From there it
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was to continue to Corahai where it v;ould nake contact v;ith
the main column.
Graziani's first objective was Corahai where a large
number of Ethiopian troops under Grazraatch Afework v/as lo-
cated, r-.oreover this place was important for two reasons;
it was a junction of caravan routes and it possessed several
water-wells the latter being of a special importance in viev/
of the scarcity of water in the Ogaden region.
In the initial stages of the advance Graziani, like
Badoglio, did not meet any serious resistance consequently
by the end of October, 1935, the whole area betv/een '.vebi
Shebelli and Fafan south of Corahai had fallen into enemy
hands. In the meantime almost every tovm of some signifi-
cance north of the occupied area and south of Gigjiga,
especially Corahai, was subjected to intensive bombardm.ent
by Italian aeroplanes. Corahai, for example, fell under
pressure from aerial bombardment alone. Grazmatch Afework in
command of this position was fataly wounded in one of the air
raids and when the troops saw their leader dead they abandoned
their position and fled before the enemy reached the position.
Corahai was thus taken without a shot on the seventh of
November.
However, the capture of Corahai did not clear the way
for a rapid drive towards Gigjiga where the main battle was
expected. Between Graziani's position and Gigjiga there were
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Deggah Bur and Sassah Baneh were believed to be the most
formidable. And so the Italians had to prepare for the
attack of this position. By November 11, 1935, (four days
after the capture of Corahai) the Italians had made a rapid
advance and reached Anale— only thirty miles from Doc^ah
Bur. On this date their advance columns were ambushed and
destroyed at Anale. For the rest of the month fierce fighting
took place in the area between Anale and Corahai, durin,",
which the Italians suffered several reverses. By the end
of the month they were forced to withdraw to Corahai.
Graziani could not, as things stood, continue his north-
ward drive. In addition to the defeat at Anale and the
expected stiff resistance his troops were immobilized by the
so called "Little Rains" which begin in October and continue
sporadically upto December. Even if he did not have these
problems it was dangerous for him to advance on Gigjiga when
his right flank was exposed to the forces of Has Desta in the
southwest. That is why he decided to have a pause before
commencing the advance northward and eliminate the threat to
his left flank by attacking Has Desta.
The Battle of Kegelle
So far Has Desta had not taken any determined steps to
relieve the pressure on the Ethiopian troops in the Cgaden
region, but now he began to send detachments against Italian
positions at Dolo and surrounding areas. It was then that
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Graziani was reminded of the danger of advancing north v;hile
his flank was subject to a strong thrust fron Ras Decta. In
attempting to capture the Ogaden defenses and ultimately
Gigjiga (which was what he planned before his defeat at
Anale) Graziani committed the same military error as Badoglio
who attacked Terabien before Amba Aradom. V/ith Kegelle in
the hands of Ras Desta, not only v/as Graziani 's flank exposed,
but also through here the Ethiopians could get arms and
supplies brought by caravans from Kenya. The disruption of
such source of supply should have been a consideration of
prime importance.
Ey the end of November Ras Desta had started advancing
towards Dolo with the intention of penetrating Italian lines
and thus cutting the enemy's line of communication. The aim
did not materialize however, as the Ethiopians were easily
driven back. But Graziani did not feel sufficiently ready
to pursue them.
By November 12, preparation had been completed and the
advance began in four columns. The main column moved be-
tween the Dawa and Genale Doria rivers heading towards Kegelle
while the three other detachments carried out flanking move-
ments to the left and right. One detachment marched along
the right bank of Webi River; parallel to it but along the
right bank of the Genale Doria moved a second detachment.
These two were to conduct mopping-up operations against pos-
sible pockets of resistance on their lines of advance, but
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their main mission v;as to protect the right flank of the
main body from Dejazmatch Beyene's threat. The third de-
tachment marched from Dolo close to the Kenya border, its
objective being the occupation of Helka Murri and the
protection of the left flank of the main body.
In the meantime Italian aeroplanes were pounding
Negelle mercilessly. From November 12th—the day the Ital-
ian advance began to the 20th—then Negelle fell— 141 bombing
22
raids v;ere conducted. Under cover of such intensive air
23
raids 40,000 motorized columns advanced on Negelle.
Taking the initiative Ras Desta's troops descended from
their highland defense positions to threaten the enemy's
advance columns, but instead of striking quickly they lingered
in the lowlands too long thereby enabling Graziani to make
full use of his tanks and aeroplanes. VJhen enemiy fire povjer
became too strong for them the Ethiopians decided to return
to their defense positions. But it was too late. The motor-
ized columns of the Genoa Dragoons and the Aosta Lancers
—
known as "The Kell on ViTieels" quickly followed them and sm.ashed
their barricades. The battle was over on November 20, 1935.
The Ethiopians had beaten a hasty retreat westward to the
province of Sidamo.
The occupation of Negelle offered Graziani the shortest
90
*" Toynbee, 0£. cit . , p. 405-
^^Del Boca, 0£. cit., p. IO5.
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and the most direct approach to Addis Ababa. But he did
not take this. From a military point of view—both strateg-
ically and tactically this was the approach because the sooner
Addis Ababa was taken the sooner the resistance v;ould have
collapsed. An early capture of the capital city v;as not
only important for its political implication and therefore
its morale effect on the Ethiopians, but it would have also
isolated the defenders on the two fronts completely. Vdth
a substantial part of the Ogaden region as v/ell as Eorona
(of which Negelle was the capital) in Italian hands it was
strategically unnecessary to insist on fighting Dejazmatch
Kessibu's army in the Ogaden because with the occupation of
Addis Ababa it would have been isolated and thus would have
collapsed by itself.
Nevertheless the Italian victory at Negelle served two
purposes; it revived the confidence of the Italian public
which was beginning to be pessimistic as a result of the slow
progress on the Korthern Front and militarily it meant the
end of Ras Desta's threat to Graziani's left flank.
The Battle of Ogaden
Actually Graziani's left flank was still threatened by
Dejazmatch Beyene Merid located at Imi with a big force
—
though not as big as Ras Desta's and this should be eliminated
before the advance of the Italian forces in the Ogaden region
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should he resumed.
Already in the second hair of December, 1935, the Sultan
of Olol-Dinle and Ilussain All (two Somali chiefs who deserted
and .-joined Graziani) were sent up the V/ebi Shobelli to attack
the Ethiopians in Bale. ^ These two deserters fell upon the
unsuspecting Ethiopian troops at Gabba and routed them, but
as they moved farther up the Ethiopians defeated them at
Karanli— a few miles south of Imi. For about a month Eeyens
Merid was not attacked again, but on February 5, 1936, Black
Shirt troops reached and hit his position in the V/eb river
not far from Imi. This attack was repulsed and the Italians
had yet to make another trial on November 11, at Mount Jigo
and again they were beaten back. A few days later another
Italian unit attacked but this v;as also repulsed. Consequently
the attempt to drive back the Ethiopians from this salient
was abandoned temporarily. Actually Beyene Merid's threat
was more theoretical than real. He was too exhausted to
attack the Italian flanks. The best he could do was to pro-
tect his own position. At any rate there v/as not much mili-
tary importance in the position he held, and thus could be by
passed. And, indeed, when Graziani tired of trying in vain
to drive him back at last ignored him and commenced the Battle
of the Ogaden
,
Beyene Merid had neither the zeal nor the
^Bale was the district (now the Province) which
Eejazmatch Beyene Merid, with his main forces at Imi was
defending.
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resources to undertake an attack against the Italian left
flank.
On April 13, 1936, the Italians started moving in force
towards their final objective in the Ogaden region. The
final objective was Gigjiga where Dejazmatch Mcssibu v/as
believed waiting in a strongly fortified position. But
before that the Italians had to traverse a wide area with
several strong outposts spread over the whole region.
The Ethiopian main defense line stretched from Gigjiga
south to Sassah Baneh and east to Eulleleh. In this rugged
hill country where patches of bare rock alternated v/ith thick
scrub he had {with the help of his Turkish advisor General
Vahib Pasha) organized what the Italians nicknamed the
Ethiopian "Hindenburg Line."
Thirty-eight thousand Italian troops of which 15,600
were Italians by origin, were set out to wrestle with an
Ethiopian force of about 28,000 spread over a wide area of
25defense. ^ The advance v;as conducted in three columns. The
first column starting from Denan was to move on the left,
capture the Ethiopian strong outpost- at Gianagobo and proceed
by way of Birkut, Dukun and Segag to Deggah Medo where another
force was believed to be entrenched. The center column




Note: The Italian troops of non-Italian origin consisted of
Lybians, Eritreans and Somalia.
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The Battle of Ogaden
Source: Del Boca
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Sassah Baneh among other minor outposts. Tho third column
was to proceed to Curati Gunu Gadu and Bullaleh. After
accomplishinc their initial objectives the three columns
wore then to wait until each was ready to launch a combined
attack against Dcgpah Bur.
During the two days of advance none of the columns mot
any incident but on the 15th the left column v/as engaged in
a fierce battle at Gianagobo. The defenders put up such a
stiff resistance that the Italians could not break the de-
fenses in three days of fighting even though General Mass!
(commanding the Italian left flank) let loose all available
machinegun and artillery fires. At the end of the three days
fighting hoviever, the Ethiopians were completely crushed and
the column continued its advance leaving behind it a battle
field covered with hundreds of dead and dying troops. At
Deggah Medo the left flank executed a brilliant surprise
attack v;ith its motorized units. The defenders were easily
routed and the place v;here a stiff fight was expected had
fallen—without much effort. This column was nov/ ready for
the assault on Deggah Bur.
The colum.ns in the center and right marched v;ithout much
resistance until April 23; then the center column met a deter-
mined force at Kamanlei; v/here it was pinned dovm for two days.
On the 25th the defenders of Hamanlei were defeated, but since
this column v^as exhausted as a result of the battle it took
four days to regain its momentiim and resume the advance.
lie
On the 29th Sar.sah Baneh fell. Similarly the ri^ht flank
had succeeded in subduing Cunu Cadu and Eullaleh one after
the other.
After two weeks of fiRhting the Ethiopians v/oro too •
exhausted to withstand the Italian advance. On April 29,
1936, Deggah Bur fell without serious resistance, and new
Graziani was ready for the big battle at Gigjiga. But it
had now become apparent the Ethiopians were fighting for a
lost cause. Supplies were almost completely exhausted, the
morale of the Ethiopian troops had gone down to the lov/est
ebb and the disertion rate had risen fearfully high. Besides
in lingering too long in this region Dejazmatch Kessibu was
running the risk of being caught between Graziani and Badoglio's
rapidly advancing northern armies. Thus the Ethiopian com-
mander retreated without offering the battle for ivhioh General
Graziani had long waited. On May 7, 1936, Gigjiga v;as cap-
tured, on the following day Harar was taken and on the 9th
Graziani 's advance guard made contact with troops from the
Northern Front at Dire Davra. The war on the Southern Front
was over two days after Badoglio entered Addis Ababa.
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CONCLUSION'
The Italo-Ethiopian conflicts whether in 1935 or in the
nintecnth century had never been fou/^ht between equally armed
adversaries, but they certainly were not, as some people
tend to believe wars between a primitive people and a civ-
ilized nation. They were, as The Times on the occassion of
the Battle of Adua pointed out, the confrontation of an
ancient dormant civilization and a modern technological
civilization.
The Ethiopian defeat cannot, therefore, be dismissed as
inevitable because of the country's backwardness. The
answers for the defeat are, as this presentation has atterr.pted,
to be sought both in internal conditions and international
politics.
One of the most crucial factors was of course, the
internal instability that ensued as a result of the Emperor's
attem.pt to build a modern centralized state powerful feudal
chiefs who had lost power and prestige by this reform were
less anxious, if not totally opposed to stand behind their
Emperor. As the war progressed disertions mounted to aminous
proportions almost in every province. It is indeed an irony
of life that the Emperor's sincere efforts to unify the country
should have resulted in pricisely the opposite.
-"-The (London) Times
. March 5, 1896.
ll?i
Another important factor was the imposition of the arr.s
embargo by Great Britain and France— from whom Ethiopia
purchased most of its arms--and the United States of America
—
to whom it looked for support. The decision of Britain and
France to impose an arms embarp:o on the agpressor and the
victim alike was unjust as it was in breach of a treaty.
It was unjust because Italy manufactured its own arms and
as long as it was free to import strategic materials from
the United States (which only prohibited arms shipment to
both belligerents) and other non sanctionst countries it.
was not actually affected by the embargo; whereas Ethiopia
—
a non-manufacturing country was denied the right to self-
defense through the refusal of these countries to sell her
arms inspite of the fact that Italy was condemned as the
aggressor.
The third major factor that added to the collapse of
the Ethiopian resistance was the League of Nations. It
was not, however, the failure of the League to render help
to Ethiopia that proved fatal. The fatality lay in the fact
that the Ethiopian Emperor took the Covenant seriously and
instead of preparing for the imminent invasion he slept under
false security. In Ethiopia they say that the death of one's
child is more bearable than the dishonor of one's vrord. To
the common man this may be no more than a hackneyed rhetoric,
but to the monarch it was an indespensable royal o.uality.
V.Tien this is seen against the background that in Ethiopia
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the affairs of state were, as they are largely today, the
reflections of the monarch's personality, the implication
of this antique imperial virtue becomes apparent. The
member states of the League of Nations had solemnly pledged
themselves to uphold the Covenant and the Emperor took t?iem
at their words. His own personal background did not dispose
him to suspect that nations do not honor their international
obligation if national interests do not permit. After all,
if Hartman's analogy of Hitler being a rattlesnake and
Kussolini a mosquito, may be taken "one does not— if one
wishes to survive—take one's eye off a threatening rattle-
snake to menace a droning mosquito."
Actually this argument is somewhat in error. Could it
not be true that Hitler was encouraged to try his expanision-
i
ist dreams when he saw Mussolini invade Ethiopia with im-
punity? Nevertheless the fact still remains that nations
(quite naturally) worry more about their interests than about
their international obligations. But it could not occur to
the Ethiopian Emperor that one could break one's word once he
had given it even v;here politics was concerned. Thus he was,
in all likelyhood, sincere when, in June 30, 1936, he told
the League
My trust in the League was absolute. I
thought it impossible that fifty-two nations
including the most powerful in the world should
^Kartman, od. cit .
, p. 317.
V/.O
be successfully opposed by a single aggressor.
Relying on the faith due to treaties, I have
made no preparation for war.
3
A decade and half later he found occassion to shov; that,
for his part, he could not flinch in the fulfillment of an
obligation to which he had pledged himself. The occassion
was the Korean war. The United Nations had found South
Korea the victim of an aggression but still most of the so-
called uncommitted nations were unwilling to go beyond
sending Red Cross units, probably because they considered
it more of a Soviet-American power struggle than an ordinary
case of aggression. But Ethiopian troops were quickly sent
there, for the Emperor's painful experience with the League
of Nations did not let him hesitate once the aggressor was
named. I'/hether his action might not have been based on an
irrelevant experience he did not wait to consider.
These three factors—the choatic internal conditions,
the inequitable imposition of an arms embargo and the false
hope given by the League of Nations—are the most crucial in
the collapse of the Ethiopian resistance. It is, of course,
idle to speculate whether Mussolini, could or could not have
succeeded if Ethiopia was not beset by these inexorable
problems; but it can he said with a fair degree of assurance,
that it would have proven a long and difficult war.
''Stephen Heald (ed) Document on International Affairs:
1935 (London: Humphrey Milford, 1937), Vol. II, p. 518.
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There are also other factors that chould be concidorcd.
There was, for instance, the obvious difference in quality
between the two armies, a well-trained modern army was
posed against Ethiopia's peasant conscripts who did not have
even the most elementary military training.
Neither coordination nor the consistent execution of a
strategic plan nor unity of command was possible on the
Ethiopian side. The feudal chiefs who in accordance with
tradition commanded in the field warriors levied in their
own provinces, followed their own inclinations rather than
the Emperor's instructions. But again such had been the case
in the past armed confrontations between the two adversaries,
but through his raw courage the Ethiopian warrior had hitherto
succeeded in offsetting the advantage of modern training.
Now it was no longer possible. This was a protracted war
fought on two fronts widely separated from each other--one in
the north, the other in the south. Moreover, the aeroplane,
the tank and the lorry (which were not utilized in the past
engagements) had now outraced the Ethiopian foot soldier and
had, thus, forced him to forfeit his superior mobility. The
relentless massed attack for which he was reputed was also
rendered obsolete by the fact that the war was being fought
not in a single battle as in the case of Adua, but over
several battlefronts. By its very nature the feudal armiy
was not suited for this kind of extended campaign.
There was also the disparity between the two adversaries.
V/y.
Hut arain thin wan true alco during the Battle of Adua. But
at that tjme Ethiopia was not without arras although, of
course, the enemy had superior weapons both in quality and
quantity. Nevertheless the Ethiopians were able to offset
the advantage of their enemy and obtain victory by their
staying power, their capacity for taking the initiative and
their relentless massed attack. But now the contest had
become between a heavily equipped and mechanized army on the
one hand and almost practically unarmed feudal levies. To be
sure, one cannot overwhelm a tank with a hoe, or an aeroplane
with an old Kotchkiss rifle, although this the Ethiopians
literally tried.
Yet despite all odds the peasant soldiers fought on to
the end. For as the correspondent for The Kew York Times
reported from the Battle of Mai Chew
The Ethiopians' courage to which the
Italians are the first to pay homage does not
acknowledge defeat until death. When they are
wounded they struggle to their feet and stum-ble forward. Decimated by artillery, moweddown by machine guns they still come on and
aie.
This, however, is not to say that Ethiopia's military
problems would have been solved if no arms embargo was im-
posed. By virtue of his possession of an air force-
which Ethiopia did not have-the enemy could still maintain
his military superiority. Ke could and did hammar at his
orce




adversaries with almost complete impunity.
That the Italian air fleet of an estimated 300 aero-
planes-' had an influence on the outcome of the v;ar no one
disagrees; but opinions differ as to the degree of its
effect. Liddell Hart, for example, did not think the Italians
achieved much with their air arm. In an article to The I'.e-rj
York Times he observed:
The offensive value of air power inevitably
handicapped by the scarcity of targets in such
a primitive country has also been wasted through
the inability of the ground forces to follow up
the effect that was attained.
^
Dejazmatch Kessibu Commander-in-Chief of the Ethiopian
forces on the Ogaden Front (Southern Front) also told a joke
to a correspondent of The Kew York Times about the ineffective-
ness of Italian aeroplanes. Thirteen planes had dropped 200
to 250 bombs and the total result was the wounding of one
chicken. As soon as the bombing ceased a soldier rushed out
to survey the damage done and finding the dying chicken said,
as he wrung its nect, "This is the one good thing the Italians
ever gave mie." And a fellov; soldier agreed but rem.inded his
friend, "Yes, but when you eat it don't forget that it cost
7thousands and thousands of Thalers."
Even Vehib Pasha, the Turkish General who was an advisor
to Nessibu discounted the seriousness of air bombardments
Toynbee, o£. cit .
, p. 379.
The New York Times
. January 19, 1936.
'^Ibid. , December 23, 1935.
1>M
althouf.h his position was constantly harassed by Italian
aircrafts. But his position was not as heavily hit as
those on the Northern Front.
Others consider that aerial bombardment especially the
sprnyinf: of poison gas was one of the most decisive factors
in thfe collapse of the resistance. The Emperor himself in
a telegram to the League of Nations on May 10, 1936, confessed
that it was the use of poison gas by Italian aeroplanes that
Q
forced him to give up the resistance. The leader of the
Dutch Red Cross Unit also stressed this factor. He is re-
ported to have said
Once they had seen the effect of gas the
Abyssinians were completely demoralized and
behaved like frightened children. 1^
Militarily speaking air v;arfare against a people the
vast majority of whom lived in small villages, and in a
country endowed by nature with the protection of vast forests,
rugged mountains and deep ravines, such as Ethiopia was, would
cost the wielder of it more than he would accomplish. Thus,
it is true that much damage was not inflicted upon troops by
Italian conventional bombings. Nevertheless the effect of
gas warfare on the Ethiopian combatant was considerable. The









London, May 19, 1936.
1^5
bu;ih nnd the forcot,;; in which ho hid from h i rh oxplo.';i. v;,';
were now drenched with pciaon Ras which clunc in the valloys
and forests for days without losing its effect. In como
particular cases the impact of the air was immense. At the
Battle of Amba Aradom, for example, 170 aeroplanes were used
to hammar at a single position that was completely without
defense against such kind of warfare. It is hard to believe
that the aeroplane could not have played a decisive role in
this battle.
Moreover the air arm vjas specially effective because it
was used against civilian centers as well. Ordinarily the
more an area is bombed the m.ore the people becom.e used to it
and thus the more it loses its effect. This may be true in'
modern societies, but it was not true in the case of Ethiopia.
In the first place Ethiopian houses wore made either of dried
mud or were thatched huts. Consequently it was easy to destroy
them. According to Ethiopian official estimates 525,000 homes
were destroyed by Italian bombardment. It v;as indiscrim-
inate destruction by the Italian air force that made the
editor of The New York Times wonder
Kov; short a way v;e have gone in two
thousand years since Philip joined the
The figure was given in 1945 by the Ethiopian Govern-
ment as one item of the list for v/nich Ethiopia received
326 million pound sterlings from Italy as war reparations.
Quoted in Del Boca, op. cit . , p. 283.
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chariot of t,hu KtliiopJan ounuch and road
the prophecy of ChrivStianity.-'-'^
In the second place in a country where communication oven
between neiphboring towns was extremely difficult and thus
where rumour was the only news the destructiveness of the
aeroplane was bound to be exaggerated. Especially when
the rumour was about something the people hitherto never had
seen, this would create more psychological terror. This
was what actually happened in the case of Ethiopia. Hence
while it cannot be taken as the one decisive factor Italian
air power quickened the collapse of the resistance more
perhaps through psychological terror than actual damage.
Lastly the failure of the Ethiopians to adopt guerrilla
tactics must be mentioned. This was, indeed the only method
left to them by which they could try and offset the over-
whelming technical superiority of their invaders. Ethiopia
with its natural mountain fastness was an ideal nursery for
guerrillas, and the Ethiopians with their light equipment
and modest needs had, at their disposal, all the requisites
for waging guerrilla warfare. Systematized guerrilla forces
would assuredly have vrorn down the enemy's nerves and would
have cut up his lines of communication vjithout offering
satisfactory targets for his air power.
Then, as Toynbee puts it




Harnhall Rndopilio'n rain of poison fine
mjfht have proved a boomeranf; weapon which
would merely have branded the wiolder of it
with dishonour and have exasperated the victim
into a redoubled will to war instead of cowing
him into abandoning the strugf^le aG hopelec3.-^3
One explanation for this failure may be the fact that
in their past encounters the Ethiopians had always succeeded
in repulsing their enemies. Consequently they had no need
to resort to this kind of warfare. Or it could be, as Captain
Liddell Hart observed, that perhaps the Ethiopians were too
courageous to be instinctive guerrilla fighters.^ Eventually,
of course, the method was adopted rather ineffectually and
this when the r.ain Ethiopian fighting force was destroyed and
the enemy had gained control of the greater part of the country.
Nevertheless the guerrillas kept the pot boiling till, with
the help of Great Britain the country was liberated in 1941.
"-^Toynbee, on. cit .
. p. 371.
The New York Times
. February 23, 1936.
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As early ns lfif!5 Italy had been preyinf, on Kthiopi.'in
territory and, although she was repulsed each time she nade
a move, she kept on tryinf; till in I896 she was decisively
defeated at the Battle of Adua. After that no further
attempt was made until about forty years later when r'ussolini
felt himself called upon by an irresistablo destiny to found
an Italian Empire in East Africa. In October 1935 he invaded
Ethiopia. Eight months later the invasion was successfully
completed.
The question v;hich this thesis proposes to answer is,
why did the Ethiopians suffer an overwhelming defeat at the
hand of an enemy whom they themselves had overwhelmingly
defeated only forty years before? Several factors are
discussed, but three are crucial.
One was the chaotic internal situation at the time of
the invasion. Vi'hen Emperor Kaileselassie ascended the
throne in 1930 he took vigorous steps to break up the feudal
system and build a modern centralized state. This alienated
feudal chiefs who had lost their traditional pov/ers and
prestige. At the very time Fascist troops were advancing
to invade Ethiopia, two of the most pov;erful provinces v;ere
in a state of revolt. In Cojam a cousin of a deposed Chief
had defied the Central government and could not be subdued
without switching troops from the Italian front. In Tigrai the
ruler of half that province declared for Italy taking with
him 10,000 troops, thereby disrupting at the last moment the
defonr.a plan on tho tJorthorn Front. An the war prof^roBoed
the numbers of feudal chicfr. , v;ho could not, at the tofinning,
openly defy the Emperor and outlying provinces which did not
consider themselves as parts of traditional Ethiopia rose to
ominous proportions.
A second crucial factor was tho inequitable imposition
of an arm.s embargo on the victim and the aggressor alike.
This particularly hurt the Ethiopian cause because it vras
imposed by Britain and France from whom she bought most of
her arms, and the United States to whom she looked for support.
In effect what this meant was that the declared aggressor,
by virtue of his capacity to produce his ovm arms, could
freely import strategic raw materials and turn them into
lethal weapons v/hile Ethiopia a nonmanufacturing country was
denied the right to purchase arms for the known purpose of
self-defense.
The difference in arms was of course, not peculiar to
this war. Such was the case during the Battle of Adua also.
But while Italy had superior arms, Ethiopia was by no means
without them. There was also the obvious difference in the
quality of the two armies. The modern Fascist armies were
fighting with Ethiopia's peasant conscripts. But again such
was the case in lfi96. Nevertheless, the Ethiopians were able
to offset the advantages of the modern training and superior
arms of their assailants and obtain victory by their capacity
for taking the initiative, their staying pov;er and relentless
massed attack. 13ut now the war had become one betv/ocn
a heavily equipped army and almost practically unarmed
feudal levieri. To be sure, one does not overwhelm a tank
with a hoe, or an aeroplane with an old Hotchkiss rifle,
although this the Ethiopians literally tried.
The third major factor that accounts for the defeat was
the failure of the League of Nations to render effective help.
It was not, however, the lack of help in itself that proved
fatal to the Ethiopian cause. The fatality lay in the fact
that the Ethiopian Emperor took the Covenant seriously and,
instead of preparing for the imminent invasion, slept under
false security.
